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Abstract 
The thesis explores how the implementation of a new forest law in Cameroon affects and interacts 
with the traditional authority system that previously regulated the forest use and forest management. 
The concepts of “Institutional Interplay”, “Cross scale institutional linkages” and “Institutional design 
(Ostrom 2005)” were used to analyse how interactions of local institutions and stakeholders influence 
community based forest management (CBFM) process in Bimbia Bonadikombo (BB) community.  
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework provided a descriptive and evaluation 
tool that examined formal and informal (rules) process and interaction in BB.  The method of data 
collection was through interviews (mostly open ended), and focus group discussion. The research 
made use of primary and secondary sources of data. Participatory tools included transect walk with a 
target group and participant observation. Some key informants were interviewed and phone 
interviews were also used to obtain information. Data collected was analysed both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Institutional and stakeholder analysis was done using a Venn diagram.  In this thesis, I 
argue that the interactions redefine forest governance and suggest risks of recentralization. Powerful 
actors especially the government, Limbe III municipality, donor organisations have influenced the 
CBFM process, and have jointly marginalized the voices of local farmer groups and other users.  The 
implementation process of the law 94/01 takes precedence over customary tenure, which justifies the 
conflict between native and non-native farmers in Bimbia Community, and why a user group 
approach as an interplay management strategy is adopted at the operational level of decision-making 
for the farmers. To say that the implementation process of law 94/01 is very interactive and 
supportive of CBFM practice is simplistic and misses the point. The participatory forest management 
system could be described as a” contractual partnership” between the state and the village 
communities. The study reveals that farmers in BB, prefer to deal with institutions that have existed 
and successfully support community forest initiatives that offer control overland by local 
communities as part of a trade off in their interaction.  
Keywords: Integration, Values, Collective decision-making level, Institutions, disenfranchised. 
 4 
Acknowledgement 
I wish to acknowledge all those who contributed in one way or the other to the realization of this 
work. My sincere gratitude goes to Dil Bahadur Khatri for his critical comments, timely responses 
and creating the necessary academic atmosphere to complete this thesis. 
 
I equally want to thank Associate Professor Örjan Bartholdson for his consistent encouragement and 
comments and more especially for taking off time from his tight schedule to guide and re-examine 
this work.  My sincere gratitude goes also to Dr Oscar Jansson for his contributions and insights, and 
all the lecturers in the Department of Rural and Urban Development,  especially Emil Sandström, 
Lars Hallgren, Linley Chiwona-Karltun, Opira Otto, Torbjörn Rydberg, and Helen Arvidsson, Per 
Edenhamn (study adviser) for supporting me in diverse ways during my studies at SLU. 
 
I will like to express my sincere gratitude to professor Kjell for taking time off his tight schedule to 
read this work, offer suggestions that made the work easier to understand, as well as serving as my 
examiner. 
 
To my colleagues in the International Master’s program me in Rural Development and Natural 
Resources Management, I say “merci” for your ideas and group contributions. Special thanks go to 
Wondmagegn Tafesse and Josefin Egerlid for their academic and moral support.  
 
I wish to thank also   the Swedish Government for their support in terms of tuition and making 
provision for my field trips.  I am grateful also to the various institutions in Cameroon, especially the 
Ministry of Secondary Education for granting me this opportunity to improve my educational 
knowledge and skills necessary for the development of the nation. I am equally thankful to some 
workers in the Ministry of Secondary Education in Yaoundé for their valuable guidance, suggestions, 
critisms, understanding, exercising delays and mal-treatment of my files especially during those tough 
times. Without their professional support and actions, this work will not have taken the structure and 
approach it took.  Special thanks go also to Mr Wotany Philip, Mr Kenneth, Mola Ngale and members 
of the Bimbia Bonadikombo Natural Resource Management Council for providing technical facilities 
and research opportunities for my field work. 
 
Special thanks go equally to my family for their support and prayers throughout my studies. Finally, I 
wish to thank God almighty for his grace in my life. 
 5 
Table of contents   
Table of figures ................................................................................ 7 
Abbreviations and Acronyms ......................................................... 8 
1 Introduction .................................................................................. 9 
1.1 Disposition.................................................................................................... 11 
1.2 Problem Statement ...................................................................................... 11 
1.3 Research Objective and Questions ............................................................. 12 
2 Theoretical Framework and Concepts ...................................... 13 
2.1 What are Institutions? ........................................................................................... 13 
2.2 Enabling Conditions: Prerequisites for Institutionalizing Community based forest 
management. ............................................................................................. 13 
2.3 The Role of Institutions in Forest Resource Management .................................... 13 
2.4 Institutional Interplay ............................................................................................. 14 
2.5 Institutional Change: Northian View ...................................................................... 15 
2.6.    Rules for Governance of Commons.................................................................. 16 
2.7. Theoretical Approaches Used in the Governance of Forest Resources. ............. 17 
2.8 The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework ............................. 18 
3 Methodology and Methods ......................................................... 20 
3.1 Interviews ............................................................................................................. 20 
3.1.1 Interviews at the Council (BBNRMC) Head Office ............................................. 20 
3.1.2 Key Informants .................................................................................................. 21 
3.1.3 Focus Group ...................................................................................................... 21 
3.2 Participant Observation and Transect Walk with Farmers .................................... 22 
3.3 Data Presentation and Analysis ............................................................................ 22 
3.4 Limitation .............................................................................................................. 23 
4 Background and study area ....................................................... 24 
4.1 Context of forest Act and its Implementation. ....................................................... 24 
4.1. 1.  Institutional History and Development of Forestry Legislation in Cameroon. .. 24 
4.1.2. Institutional Description of the Implementation process of law 94/01. .............. 25 
4.2 Study Area ............................................................................................................ 30 
4.2.1. The Limbe III municipality ................................................................................. 30 
4.2.2  Bimbia Bonadikombo Community Forest (BBCF) ............................................. 32 
4.2.3 History of Bimbia ............................................................................................... 33 
4.2.4 Bimbia Bonadikombo Natural Resources Management Council (BBNRMC)..... 35 
5 Findings ....................................................................................... 38 
5.1 (1) How does the implementation process of forest law 94/01 affect forest 
management in Bimbia Bonadikombo Community (BBC)?(2) How do the 
farmers react to and perceive the implementation of law 94/01? ............. 38 
5.1.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries ............................................................................... 38 
5.1.2 User Rights ........................................................................................................ 40 
5.1.3 Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules and Local Conditions.
................................................................................................................... 41 
5.1.4 Minimum Recognition of Rights to Organize ...................................................... 42 
5.1.5 Collective Choice Arrangements ....................................................................... 43 
5.1.6 Monitoring .......................................................................................................... 43 
5.1.7 Graduated Sanctions and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms .............................. 44 
5.1.8 Nested Enterprises ............................................................................................ 45 
5.2.1 Institutional and stakeholder relationship of Power. ................................. 46 
5.2.2 Institutional relationship of control ............................................................ 49 
 6 
5.2. 3 Social and environmental relationship. .................................................... 50 
6 Analyses and Discussion. .......................................................... 54 
7 Conclusion ................................................................................. 62 
References...................................................................................... 63 
Internet ............................................................................................................... 64 
APPENDIX....................................................................................... 65 
Appendix 1: Semi- structured questions (Interview guide used in both 
Interviews,  and Focus Group Discussions for both registered and non-
registered farmers (Natives and non-natives) .......................................... 65 
Interview guide with forest manager and forest extension workers. .................. 66 
Assessment of outcome of the management process at the operational level. 66 
 
 
  
 7 
Table of figures 
 
 
Figure 1The IAD framework based on Ostrom et al 1994. .................................................... 19 
Figure 2 Interview at the office (Author, 2011). ..................................................................... 21 
Figure 3 Interview with farmers during transect walk (Author, 2011). ................................... 22 
Figure 4 Map shows BBCF boundaries with land cover showing dense forest, open forest, 
mangroves, farmland, settlement, plantations, water. (Source:Mor Achankap Bakia 
GIS UNIT, Programme for sustainable management of Natural Resources, 
MINFOF, S.W:R Cameroon.). ................................................................................ 29 
Figure 5 Map showing BBCF boundaries with contours 20m interval, showing farmland, 
open forest, dense forest, settlement, rivers, mangroves, (Source:Mor Achankap 
Bakia, GIS UNITS:PSMNR,MINFOF, S.W.R,cameroon. ....................................... 33 
Figure 6 Venn diagram showing institutions charged with power. (Land-tenure and resource 
control) This institutions are represented in two ways. Firstly from the size of each 
circle and secondly from the distance of the institution to the problem (Source: 
Author;2012.) ......................................................................................................... 47 
Figure 7 Demographic information of respondents in Bimbia Bonadikombo Community. .... 50 
Figure 8 Summary Description of BBCF Actors and their strategies (Source: Author, 2014)
 ............................................................................................................................... 53 
 
 
  
 8 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
BBC Bimbia Bonadikombo Community 
BBCF Bimbia Bonadikombo Community Forest 
BBNRMC Bimbia Bonadikombo Natural Resource management Council 
BBSMP Bimbia Bonadikombo Simple Management Plan 
BLCC Bakweri Land Claims Committee 
C.D.C. 
CBM 
Cameroon Development Corporations 
Community Based Management  
CATWOE 
 
CF  
CFM 
Customers, Actors, Transformation, Weltanschauung or world view, 
Owners, Environment 
Community Forest. 
Community Forest management. 
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency 
CIPE Center for International Private Enterprise 
CPR Common Pool Resource 
CPR Common Property Resource 
ECP European Colonial Powers 
EPHTA Eco-regional Program for the Humid and Sub-Humid Tropics of Africa 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 
FCC Federal Communications Commissions 
FEP Farmer Education Program 
FRMP 
FUG 
Forest Resource Management Power 
Forest User Group. 
IAD Institutional Analysis and Development 
LBG 
MC 
Limbe Botanical Garden 
Management Committee 
MCP 
MINEF 
Mount Cameroon Project 
Ministry of Environment and Forest.  
MINFOF 
MoP 
Ministry of Forest and Fauna 
Manual of procedures and Norms for the acquisition and Management of 
community Forests. 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NIE New Institutional Economics 
NRM Natural Resource Management 
PRA 
RCDC 
Participatory Rural Appraisal 
Regional Centre For Development and Conservation. 
RUAF Resource Centre on Urban Agriculture and Forestry 
SANDEE 
SFM 
South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics 
Sustainable Forest Management.  
SLU Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
SMPBBCF Simple Management Plan For Bimbia Bonadikombo Community Forest 
SSM 
VARCIG 
VLFCC 
Soft System Methodology 
Victoria Area rainforest Common Initiative Group. 
Victoria Lands and Forest Conservation committee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
1 Introduction 
Institutions are the formal and informal rules and norms that organize social, political and 
economic relations (North, 1990).  Examples of informal institutions are customary or 
traditional rules and others which are not created under the formal system, whereas the 
formal rules are the opposite. “Whereas institutions are sets of rules of the game or codes of 
conduct defining social practices, organizations are material entities possessing offices, 
personnel, budgets, equipment and legal personality” (Young, 1996). These definitions of 
institutions and organisations, formal and informal rules, are often misinterpreted by 
scholars, but the rule-like character of institutions is consistent with my definition in this 
thesis.  
The success of formal and informal institutions depends not only on their own performance, 
but also on their interaction with other arrangements that have overlapping jurisdiction 
(Young et al, 1999: 49).  Interaction between institutions can reinforce their effectiveness 
on management. On the other hand, inadequacy of institutions, can  lead to disruption in the 
achievement of agreed management objectives, diminishing or even offsetting gains from 
cooperation between entities. In both cases, coordination is necessary to consolidate rules 
and reduce conflict, or to exploit synergies in implementation (Young, 1999).  
 
The Bimbia Bonadikombo Natural Resource Management Council (BBNRMC, manages 
3735 of community forest in the Mt. Cameroon forest area, a biodiversity area in the South 
West Region of Cameroon (Myers et al., 1999, Olson and Dinerstein, 2002).1 It is an 
outcome of the Cameroon government`s 1994 decentralized forestry law, which allowed for 
the creation of community forest not exceeding 5000 hectares (Forbes and Besong, 2002; 
Djeumo, 2001; Egbe, 2001). The farmers in Bimbia Bonadikombo Communities (BBC), 
mostly produce subsistence crops for their families and market a very small part of their 
surplus.2   
 
 Mengang (1982), explains that before the arrival of the colonial administrators in the 
country, natural resources were managed according to the “People’s law” (that is family 
law).3 He argues that, the village chiefs were the main administrators when it comes to 
resource management. 4So with the arrival of the colonial administrators, natural resources 
which had belonged to the people became the property of the first colonial administration 
and a formal administrative structure evolved (Ibid).5 In his opinion, the colonial 
                                                          
1 BBNRMC is a local group that manages the community forest. 
2 In this thesis, the farmers are mostly peasant and produce in small scale. A small-scale 
farmer is described as a person who owns or works on a farm, or operates an agricultural 
entity either commercial, or to sustain himself and family.  Farmers earn their living 
through farming, but the additional income may vary substantially 
 
3 (1) There is no accepted definition of family law. Family law is seen as the law governing 
the relationship between children and parents, and between adults in close emotional 
relationship. See Murphy (2005) and B, Stark (2005) on the growing significance of 
international family law. (2) It consists of a body of statutes and case precedents that 
govern the legal responsibilities between individuals who share a domestic connection. 
Most often the parties are related by blood or marriage. Egbe (2007, page 32). 
4For example, before Cameroon nation -state came into being tribal, or ethno-cultural, 
entities or groups existed as Nationalities with territorial limits and powers over land and 
resources. Such seemed to have been the case with bakweri people who in their claim of 
landed patrimony got into conflict with German/British colonialist with respect of CDC 
occupied land. (See letter No 1178/MINAGRI/CAB/IG3 0f  6th June 2003) www.blcc.org.  
5 According to Mengang (1982), when a hunting party returned to a village after a hunt, all 
the animals killed were brought to the chief whose duty within the village council was to 
distribute the meat to all the villagers. Under customary regimes, land is overseen by 
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administrators  then started the development or creation of protected areas and reserves, and 
this created tension between rural communities and the newly created administrative 
structures.6 A good example is the Limbe Botanical Garden (LBG) which was created after 
World War I, following the German colonization of Cameroon. This garden is an example 
of bio-diversity conservation in Cameroon (Mengang, 1982). As time went on, according to 
Ngwasiri (2001), colonial policy on natural resources was essentially hegemonic in 
character, and intended to guarantee regular supply of agricultural and forestry resources to 
Germany. Such policies generated conflicts especially from indigenous population, as 
exemplified by the (BLP) Bakweri land problem7 (Ngwasiri 1995; Tumnde 2001; Lambi 
2003). Having gone through three colonial reigns namely, German, French and English, 
Cameroon disregarded the customary or traditional tenure systems and favoured a statutory 
system, through expropriation of community controlled land and forests and imposition of 
state ownership (ADB, 2009; USAID, 2010). The laws governing land and forest in 
Cameroon are the 1974 Land Ordinance governing national lands and the 1994 forestry 
law. However, implementation of these laws was not without challenges.  
 
Agrawal and Clark (2001) argue that due   to poor outcomes associated with government 
centred policies, many conservation policies in some African countries failed, because the 
traditional approaches and local authorities that once controlled these resources were 
disenfranchised.8 According to Agrawal and Clark (2001), if local communities are not 
involved in active management of natural resources, it is likely that they will harvest 
resources at an unsustainable rate.  In this regard effective decentralisation9 and devolution 
of power and control of resources from centralised state to local communities has become a 
pressing policy issue throughout the world today (Brown 1999).  The involvement of local 
communities and approaches in the management of forest resources takes several forms, 
depending upon the environment and the degree of involvement.  According to Alden Wily 
(2002) depending upon what is actually agreed in terms of management agreements or 
contracts between the government and the community, with over- simplification 
participatory forest management in  Bimbia Bonadikombo  community  may broadly 
assume the following typology: “Contractual Partnership”, where the roles are more 
substantial but still inequitable. 
 
The 1994 forestry law, introduced Community based forest management in Cameroon, and 
was supposed to be based on a decentralized management system.  The aim was to improve 
the legislative framework and promote community participation in forest management 
                                                          
traditional local leaders or chiefs who ensure management and community based 
control(fisiy,1992; ADB, 2009). 
6 Environment, research.yale.edu/documents/downloads/0-9/102 Mengang.pdf. 
7 The Bakweri Land Problem is the expropriation of over 400 square miles of fertile 
bakweri land by some 23 German Plantation developers and then later, the Cameroon 
Development Corporation (C.D.C.) united all the plantations and used them for commercial 
purposes without payment of royalties for the use of the land to the bakweri natives 
(considered as owners of the land). See 1922 British Annual Report to the League of 
Nations. http://www.blccarchives.org. 
8 Disenfranchised in this thesis describes a person or group of people who are stripped of 
their rights or power.  
9 Decentralization can take different forms (Rondinelli, Cheema 1983): (1) 
Deconcentration- dispersing decision making authority to reach the entire territory. 
(2) Delegation –allocating decision making authority to local governments. (3) Devolution- 
financial and legal establishment of government bodies at the sub-national level (4) 
divestment- transfer of planning and administrative responsibilities from government to 
private or non-governmental institutions.  
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(Brown, 1999). 10 The inhabitants of Bimbia (mainly subsistence farmers)11 dependence on 
farming and the heterogeneous population structure have posed great difficulties to the 
implementation of sustainable and participatory forest management (Nuesiri, 2008). 12  
 
As the government enters into agreement with the local community in Bimbia, questions 
arise about the interplay or overlap of jurisdiction and membership of this form of 
collaborative forest management. This  thesis aims at encouraging policy experts to pay as 
much attention to  how this interplay of  formal and informal institutions at the management 
phase,  especially at  operational level of decision making, affect the activities  of registered 
farmers and other stakeholders.    
  
1.1 Disposition 
The thesis is structured in the following manner.  Part one discusses the problem statement, 
the objectives and research questions. Part two focuses on the theoretical framework and 
concepts.  Part three describes the methodology and methods.  Part four presents the 
background and study area.  Part five presents the findings, while part six presents the 
analysis and discussion. The conclusion as well as the implications are drawn from the 
analysis and presented in part seven. .  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
There has been commendable effort in promoting Community Forest Management by 
government institutions, traditional institutions as well as development organisations, in 
order to implement good governance of forest resources at local level and ensure food 
security for village communities in Bimbia Municipality of the Southwest Region of 
Cameroon. In-spite of this fact, there has been little study on the potential effects of law 
94/01 for the management activities of farmers in village communities. Little attention is 
directed also to farmers’ perception of the law. The significance of farmers’ perception has 
been ignored mainly by excluding them from the designing and implementation processes 
at the operational level of decision making as well as assessment of the outcome of the law. 
This neglect is important for it affects the success of the aim of Community Forest 
Management, especially in Bimbia Bonadikombo Community (BBC), composed of mainly 
farmers and fishermen.  
 An understanding of farmers’ perception is relevant for it could explain the problems 
relating to the encroachment (Illegal expansion) of farms within the community forest, as 
well as reasons for: (1) failed adopted formal and informal processes, (2) insufficient 
participation by farmers targeted by the council (BBNRMC), (3) using inadequate 
enforcement mechanisms by the management of the council (BBNRMC).13 
                                                          
10 Improve the legislative framework in terms of designing good constitutional, collective 
choice and operational rules. These rules are to be used in defining boundaries 
geographically and in terms of membership, used in control and ownership of resources, 
monitoring of resources, conflict resolution, graduating sanctions, as well as users rights to 
resources.  
11Subsistence farming is the type of farming that provides for family needs with little 
surplus for marketing.  
12 Many ethnic groups and migrants from within Cameroon(Northwest and West, Littoral 
Regions) and foreign nationals (From Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Togo, Gabon etc) who 
depend on the forest for their livelihood. Topa et al. (2009, p.36) note that “management of 
the Bimbia Bonadikombo community forest occurs in a complex setting- the margin of 
urban development…it is feared that this model is not sustainable” without external 
support.. 
13 Formal and informal institutions are often hampered by personal vested interest of the 
actors who created the institution, ineffective implementation or inadequacy of the rules. 
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The different stakeholders within the village communities in Bimbia have “vested interest” 
which they want to uphold, and as such they are often pulled in opposing camps.  The study 
explores the interaction of the rules  and the effect  on management ,14finding out (the 
extent to which outputs satisfy actor objectives, and forces influencing the management 
process) what has worked and what has not worked, and makes suggestions on how they 
could be improved.  
 
1.3 Research Objective and Questions 
The first  aim of this research is to explore the impact  of  the implementation process of 
law 94/01 on  the management phase, on the  operational level of decision making, and how 
it affects the concerned  farmers` perception  (with regards to access, ownership, and 
control of forest resources). These are the research questions: 
(1) How does the implementation process of forest law 94/01 affect forest 
management in Bimbia Bonadikombo Community (BBC)? 
(2) How do the farmers react to and perceive the implementation of law 94/01?  
 
The second objective is to describe the type of relationship that emanates from the 
interaction of the formal and informal rules with actors within BBC.  
(3) What sort of relationship exist (in terms of power, control, social and 
environmental) between the management council (BBNRMC), the registered 
farmers and other local organizations, and how do the local farmers perceive these 
relationships? 
 
                                                          
 
14 Institutional effects looks at that external or indirect impact an institution may have on a 
wide range of behaviours and outcomes that the institution does not normally target (Young 
and Levy, 1999, 3-16).  
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2 Theoretical Framework and Concepts 
2.1 What are Institutions? 
North (1990, 3), defines Institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that shape 
interaction. In consequence, they structure incentives in human exchange, whether 
political, social or economic”. His definition of Institutions comprises implicit constraints, 
formal rules and enforcement mechanisms. Apparently, any formal rule is at least partially 
backed, supplemented or contradicted by a number of implicit rules that can take the form 
of taboos, customs, traditions, code of conduct, routines, conventions (North, 1990; 6, 43, 
83). Riker (1982; 4) defines institutions as “rules about behaviour, especially about making 
decisions”. Charles Plott (1979; 156), also defines institutions to mean “the rules for 
individual expression, information transmittal, and social choice”. I used the “rule 
approach” in defining institutions. North insist that rules must be “clearly differentiated 
…from the players” in spite of ambiguities in the definition.  North (1994, 361) argues that 
interaction between institution and organisation shapes the institutional evolution of an 
economy. 
2.2 Enabling Conditions: Prerequisites for Institutionalizing Community based forest 
management. 
There are enabling conditions (prerequisites) for institutionalizing Community based forest 
management. A community with identifiable membership is important for community 
organization, decision-making and benefit sharing, control and regulation of behaviour, 
sharing of responsibilities and accountability (Ostrom, 1999). In Cameroon, for 
communities to be able to engage in forest management, they must be recognized by the 
government as a legal participant in the management of the forest. (Heermans, J and Otto, 
J.,1999; AFORNET, 2005). 15 These communities have farmer organization (for example, 
BBNRMC in Bimbia) which are considered robust in that,  the day- to- day operational 
rules have been devised and modified overtime according to a set of collective –choice and 
constitutional –choice rules (Shepsler, 1989). Given the variation in operational specific 
rules in use, the sustainability of these organization is based on specific attributes of related 
physical system, cultural views of the society, and economic and political relationships that 
exist in the setting (Ostrom, 1999). In these thesis, Ostroms `s (1991) “designed principles” 
are used, which are characteristics of resource governing institutions, required for a system 
such as BBCF to be successful.16 They include clearly defined boundaries; Users rights; 
Agreement between appropriation, provision rules and local conditions; Collective choice 
arrangements; Monitoring; Graduated sanctions; Conflict resolution mechanism; and 
Nested enterprises.   
2.3 The Role of Institutions in Forest Resource Management 
The interaction between people who apply formal rules and those that rely on informal 
rules shapes the use of forest resources in different communities Anne (2008). Generally, 
“operational rules” comprise both formal and informal rules, and these rules are being used 
by communities in making decisions regarding land and forest resource.17 
                                                          
15 To be the legal participant, they need to be defined, with clearly defined boundaries 
which delineate limits of their jurisdiction (FAO, 2002). 
16 A “designed principle” is defined as a conception used consciously or unconsciously by 
those constituting and reconstituting a continuing association of individuals about a general 
organized principle.” 
17 The task of a manager is to shape formal and informal rules, influencing the operation of 
the organization or enty.in such a way as to increase the functionality. Functionality here 
means, the capacity to coordinate task, achieve levels of cooperation or respond to changing 
conditions (Chacance, B., (2008).  
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According to Pacheco, P. (2008), formal and informal rules affect how communities 
control, allocate, legitimize, and enforce land and forest tenure rights. Secondly, by 
imposing formal regulations and models, it affects the local system’s way of using and 
managing forest resources. Thirdly, formal regulations are sometimes constraints or 
opportunities to individuals, and this affects community interaction with markets.  
 
Weber (1921) observed that the relationship between informal behavioural regularities and 
formal rules is complex and reciprocal. Pejovich (1999, p.170) puts forward different 
instances of relations: 1) Formal institutions supress, but fail to change informal 
institutions; 2) Formal rules directly conflict with informal rules; 3) Formal rules are either 
ignored or rendered neutral; and 4) “Formal and informal rules cooperate”- as in cases 
where the state institutionalizes informal rules that had evolved too  spontaneously. 
Pejovich observes: “When formal rules conflict with prevailing informal rules, the 
interaction of their incentives will tend to raise transaction costs and reduce the production 
of wealth in the community” (Pejovick 1999, p. 171). 
 
North’s theory of Institutional change distinguishes between formal and informal 
institutions and underlines the inertial character of the latter. North talks about alteration 
produced by discontinuous institutional change such as revolution and conquest. North 
defines Institutions as constraints. He notes that “informal constraints that are culturally 
derived will not change immediately in reaction to changes in the formal rules,” leading to 
“tension between altered formal rules and the persistent informal constraints” (North 1990, 
p.45)18  
 
 
2.4 Institutional Interplay 
Institutional interplay refers to the relationship of an institution to, and interaction with one 
or more other institution. Interplay refers to the phenomenon where one institution 
intentionally or unintentionally affects another (King, 1997). Young identifies four types of 
linkages (Young et al. 1999: 62-64). Functional linkages are when the operation of one 
institution directly influences the effectiveness of another through some substantive 
connection among activities involved.19 The problems could be linked in bio-geophysical 
or socio-economic terms. Political linkages are involved when actor actively seek to link 
and/or  integrate two or more institutions. These are subject to deliberate manipulation by 
the actors concerned with particular problem.20Young et al, also showed that interplay 
occur along horizontal and vertical axis. 21Vertical linkages cut across levels of social 
                                                          
18 Informal constrains are linked to cultural inheritance while changes in formal rules are 
made and enforced by the policy. 
19 Interplay may be as a result of the politics of institutional design and management 
deriving from a common interest and goal. For example in BBCF, sometimes the council 
(BBNRMC), municipality, or delegate for forestry issues permits to exploit timber, leading 
to conflict of responsibilities.  Interdependency and mutual interest sometimes leads to 
competition or collaboration (both formal and informal) amongst institutions at various 
administrative and geographical scales (Berkes, 2002). Berkes (2002), takes a perspective 
from the bottom. In BBCF,  I look at linkages on the operational level of management. 
Young (2002) approaches the problem by linking the constitutional level to global. The 
marriage of these two complementary approaches helps us to look at the linkages from the 
operational level of management to the constitutional level of management and vice versa.  
20 Note that “Politics of institutional design and management” come into play when actors 
forge linkages between issues and institutions intentionally in the interest of per suing 
individual or collective goals (Young et al. 1999: 60-65, Young 2002).  
21 Key actors involved in the institutional design to create BBCF are, the Mount Cameroon 
Project Limbe (MCP), funded by British Government through the Department for 
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organisation, whereas horizontal linkages are found among institutional arrangements 
operating at the same level of social organisation. Young differentiates when arrangements 
are embedded in principles and practice, arrangements are nested by design within 
functionally or geographical broader regimes, arrangements are as a result of deliberate 
clustering of several regimes across functional or geographical boarders, and when 
arrangements simply overlap largely unintentionally (Young, 1999: 165-172). 22  
 
2.5 Institutional Change: Northian View 
According to North (1990), Institutional change is assumed when net benefit from change 
out weight’s the cost (Menard et al., 2001). North’s 1973 book with Robert Paul Thomas 
“The Rise of the Western World. A New Economic History” accords organizational and 
institutional change a greater role in determining growth. North asserts that “efficient 
economic organization is the key to growth”. Efficient economic organization entails “the 
establishment of institutional arrangements and property rights that create incentives to 
channel individual economic efforts into activities that bring private rate of return close to 
the social rate of return” (North and Thomas, 1973, p.1). In his breakthrough book 
“Structure and Change in Economic History”, he dismissed the assumption that institutions 
were efficient (North 1981). North’s (1990) book, “Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance”, he abandoned neo-classical assumptions about efficiency and 
rationality (1990a). In this book he argues that “Third world countries are poor because the 
institutional constraints define a set of payoffs to political, economic conditions that do not 
encourage productive activity” (Ibid, p.110). North equally uses the concept of transaction 
cost to address the question why some countries are rich and others poor. This concept can 
be used to address the question why some farmers are rich and others poor.23 
                                                          
International Development (DFID), the Global Environmental Facility, and the Cameroon 
government (Forbes and Besong, 2002). These actors interacted vertically with indigenous 
institutions (the Limbe Traditional Council, the Victoria Land and Forest Conservation 
Committee (VLFCC), and Victoria Area Rainforest Common initiative Group (VARCIG) 
(Oji and Tekwe, 1998). Vertically, the MCP helped non-indigenous forest users to form 
farmer groups, charcoal producers, timber exploiters and fuelwood users groups within 
BBNRMC (Tekwe and Percy, 2001).  
22 For example, Law 94/01 recognizes two types of forest landscapes. Permanent (State 
forest and council forest) and Non- Permanent (Private forest and community forest) 
(Government of Cameroon, 1994). State forests are protected forest (national parks, 
wildlife reserves) and production forest. Council forests are managed in a decentralized 
manner by elected local councils on the basis of management plans approved by MINFOR. 
Private forest belongs to individuals and community forest is managed by communities. So 
interplay of formal rules with other existing governance institutions occur at different 
management levels (Operational, collective-choice, constitutional level). Cameroon has 
diverse modes of forest management. Examples are Leasehold forestry, Collaborative forest 
management, Community based regimes, and Government managed forest and Protected 
areas and Private forest. These regimes have distinct governance mechanisms with respect 
to forest management responsibilities and benefit distribution. With respect to Community 
–based management regimes in Cameroon, the degree of community autonomy and the 
level of benefits to communities vary. For example, in BBCF, management is through the 
BBNRMC (see constitution of board). So local communities do not enjoy full autonomy of 
management and use of forest products, and income from the forest resources is invested in 
community forest. Sometimes management arrangements are embedded under collaborative 
forest management in which communities have limited rights over management and use of 
forest products and a percentage of income remains for local level or government.  
23 In BBC, the interaction of certain rules has brought about changes in land scape 
management. There  is a link between tenure and land use change due to some social 
institutions that have influence land cover dynamics, for example the conversion of forest 
to farm land. Also conflict between state rules and customary rules has brought about 
changes in settlement patterns, and land appropriation strategies. For example when it was 
announced that BBCF is under” state protection” and the local people noticed the expansion 
of control in what they considered as their land, some reacted by clearing more forest to 
 16 
 
North (1990) argues in this book that institutional change occurs when those economic or 
political entrepreneur who have the bargaining strength to change institutions perceive that 
“they could do better by altering the existing institutional framework by some margin. But 
their perceptions depend on both the information the entrepreneur receives and how they 
process that information” (Ibid. 8). But their information is often incomplete, their models 
imperfect and their reforms constrained by existing set of institutions and incentives. North 
argues further, that reforms are also constrained by societies’ inherited belief system. 
 
2.6.    Rules for Governance of Commons.  
Three types of rules have been identified that directly or indirectly affect people’s 
behaviour in a given society. They include: Operational rules, collective decision-making 
rules and constitutional rules (Ostrom et al. 1997). Each of these rules in turn affects 
different types of decisions. 
 
Operational rules are rules that are commonly used on a daily or regular basis and they 
directly affect individual behaviour and perceptions. According to Thomson and 
Freudenberg (1997), these might be considered “surface level” since they are closest to the 
behaviours affecting the resource base.  On the other hand, collective decision-making rules 
are mostly experienced at an intermediate level. These rules determine how rules are 
defined, and they influence emerging regulations used at operational level. Lastly 
constitutional rules are rules that are used to determine who can participate in the political 
system, what powers and authority they exercise, and how collective decision-making rules 
are created (Ostrom et al. 2001; Ostrom 1999a). The operational rules according to Ostrom 
(1999a), are those that individuals use in making decisions or “the set of rules that 
participants will make reference to if asked to explain and justify their actions” (p.51). 
 
Thomson and Freudenberg (1997) are of the opinion that for a rule to be considered 
operational, it must actually affect the way people behave towards their resource. They 
suggest that working rules have different sources ranging from informal agreements 
(written or not) on traditional practice by communities to written rules created by 
governments. Operational rules can be formal or informal, and could be rooted in customs 
or defined by externally imposed formal laws.  
 
 Some scholars refer to informal rules or customary property rights as pre-existing rules for 
community forest management that have not been codified in law (Otsuka and Place 2002), 
while others refer to activities developed outside of formal law as “informal sectors” or 
“informal economies” (Guhakhasnobis et al. 2006). It is challenging therefore to assess 
informal institutions giving these multiple concepts and frame work. Some scholars 
separate formal and informal institutions by placing state regulations enforced by an 
external authority on the formal side and customary or community rules that are self-
enforced on the informal side (Eriksson 2004; cousins 1997). Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 
p.725) define informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are 
“…created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels”. 
Sometimes, informal rules are classified outside the scope of the formal legal frameworks 
at any scale of decision making, and that are crafted outside of officially sanctioned , or 
recognized by the state. In this regard, customary rules are not always synonymous with 
informal rules, as they are sometimes recognized by the state. The state may decide not to 
intrude into areas governed by customary law (Fitzpatrick, 2005), or it may attempt to 
codify customary practices into formal law. Institutional change has made it possible for 
                                                          
assert customary control over such forest land and resources for themselves  and their 
descendants..  
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customs to survive through change and adaptation in response to social realities and 
particularly in relation to the dominant society. 
 
With regards to evaluating the performance of the interaction of rules, based on 
governance 24literature reviewed (UNDP; 1997a, Gaventa and Valderrama, 1999, JICA; 
1995) some key dimensions could be identified and defined. Some include competence, 
respect for rights and indigenous knowledge, equity, participation, and empowerment. 
Participation 25as an example could enhance interaction of the rules as well as interaction of 
the actors.26  
 On the other hand, effectiveness and efficiency of the interactions of rules could be 
assessed in terms of relationships, and farmer’s perception of the forest management 
process.  When an economy or process works efficiently, no reallocation of a resource will 
improve the welfare of some person or group without making someone else worse off (that 
is Pareto- efficient).27 
With regards to equity, this criterion considers whether formal and informal rules are 
designed to make decision-making process and its implementation fair,28 and if it results in 
an equitable distribution of resources and power. The management process should consider 
certain sensibilities (such as gender, age, religion, cultural heritage and practices of the 
community) when drafting rules and access to information and responsibilities (Minang, 
2003). 29  
2.7. Theoretical Approaches Used in the Governance of Forest Resources. 
In order to understand the governance of forest resources, some major theoretical 
approaches are used.  These approaches include the Common Pool Resources Approach, 
and the Socio-historical Approaches.  
 
The Common Pool Resource Approach (CPRA) takes it point of departure in challenging 
Hardin`s notion of “the tragedy of the commons” (1998). According to Hardin, individuals 
are selfish and have this tendency to free-ride, and most commons are unstable, hence 
should be privatized. Most commons have institutional arrangements, a tendency to be over 
exploited. With Common Pool, individuals can cooperate and create institutional 
arrangements so as to avoid the “Tragedy of the Commons” 30situation. (C.F: Ostrom, 
                                                          
24 Governance is defined by FAO (2007) as the process of governing: “It is the way in 
which society is managed and how the competing priorities of interests of different groups 
are reconciled. It includes the formal institutions of government but also informal 
arrangements for achieving this ends”. 
25 Participation can be defined as “empowering people to mobilize their capacities, be it 
social actors rather than passive subjects, manage the resources, make decisions and control 
the activities that affects their lives” (LIED, 1994). Local participation is “ a strategy of 
devolution of authority and power, resources, distribution of rights and duties from state to 
local level of governance and from public to civil society”. ( Vedeld, 2002:13) 
26 If the formal and informal institutions are designed in such a way that special attention is 
given to disadvantaged groups (in the case of BBCF, women groups and youth groups), this 
could have an effect on the incentives of the actors, the nature and level of interaction, as 
well as the impact on management.  
27 If formal and informal rules are properly shaped, for example by communicating them to 
the stakeholders on time, or properly coordinating and considering them for use by 
management, interaction functionally/horizontally/vertically could be evaluated as efficient 
or effective.  
28 Fair in this case of good governance implies that every stakeholder be given equal 
opportunity to contribute to decision making. Disadvantage groups should be given special 
attention to get them participate.  
29 These factors have an effect on the nature, level and impact of the interaction. 
30 Tragedy of the Commons by Garrett Hardin (1968), argues that shared resources tend inevitably to 
be over used and ruined. He proposed Privatization or state regulation based on information available 
as solution (Geof Glass, 2011). www.youtube.com 
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1990, Baland and Platteau, 1996).  In the case of BBCF, the forest is meant to serve the 
interest of the village communities within Bimbia municipality, who are mainly registered 
and non-registered farmers and fishermen within their village councils or quarters, or 
registered groups within the Management Council. . With this approach, it is costly to 
exclude any community member from using the resource, and the benefits consumed by 
one individual, subtract from the benefit available to others. This is why the government 
and the village communities in Bimbia have set up institutional arrangements so as to avoid 
the “Tragedy of the commons” situation.31 
  
The socio-historical approach uses historical narratives to network and context to explain 
natural resource management arrangements. It emphasizes institutional processes as 
manifestation of negotiated social processes embedded in wider contexts of history and 
politics (C. F Hansen, 2007, Cleaver and Toner, 2006, Lund, 2006, Johnson, 2004, Cleaver, 
2000 and 2002, Berry, 1993 and Long, 1992).  
In the case of BBCF, the Cameroon government drew lessons from the colonial 
administration and some informal institutions in Bimbia. Based on history and culture of 
the bakweri people (the Isubu), the village communities within Bimbia, could make 
legitimate claim in respect of their land and forest.32 
2.8 The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework 
.This frame work introduces the context in which the local actors interact to create the 
institutional arrangements that shape their collective decisions and individual actions. 
Regardless of how the implementation processes of forest resources at regional and national 
level might change, the ultimate effects are filtered through the local context. I made use of 
the IAD framework because Common Pool Resources are compatible with the IAD 
framework. 33 The local actors for example, the chiefs and heads of quarters , the 
municipal council officials, government representatives who work in the locality, non-
governmental Organisations (NGOs), and private business representatives, and village 
elites  will interpret or perceive these policy processes according to the specific institutional 
context as shaped by biophysical and socioeconomic and historical attributes.  In summary, 
this framework conceptualizes the outcomes of the implementation process of law 94/01, as 
the result of how the traditional governance actors within BBCF, organize the institutional 
arrangements to respond to farmer requirements, opportunities and constraints 
                                                          
 
31 The BBNRMC has been set up to regulate the use of forest products. 
32 Historically, ethno-cultural entities or groups in Cameroon existed as nationalities with 
territorial limits. Such seemed to have been the case with the bakweri people who in their 
claim of landed patrimony got into conflict with German and British colonialist with 
respect to Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) occupied land. This history 
empowers the bakweri-man`s fight for his rights.  
33 Common Pool Resources (CPR) are resources (such as forest or fisheries) that benefit 
groups of people but provide diminishing benefits to every one if each individual pursues 
his or her selfish interest. So the IAD framework identifies key variables within the CPR 
which can be used to evaluate the role of institutions in shaping the interaction and decision 
making processes. 
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Figure 1The IAD framework based on Ostrom et al 1994. 
 
Figure 1, describes the IAD framework developed by Elinor Ostrom et al. According to this 
framework, policy processes and outcomes are assumed to be affected to some degree by 
variables external to individuals. These include attributes of the physical world, attributes 
of the community 34 within which actors are embedded, rules that create incentives and 
constraints for certain actions, and interaction with other individuals (see Ostrom et 
al.1994). 
 
                                                          
34 The “Community” is an important context that affects individual actions, including 
things like “generally accepted norms of behaviour, the level of common understanding 
about actions arenas, the extent to which preferences are homogeneous, and distribution of 
resources amongst members” (p.45). 
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3 Methodology and Methods 
This thesis makes use of a case study design. Case study research is concerned with the 
complexity, the totality of social organization and its interconnected practices of a case 
(Bryman, 2008). The research is qualitative.  I used the method of interviewing (structured 
and semi-structured), focus group discussion and review of relevant literature from books 
and journals and Annual Reports.   In line with ethical guidelines, I assured the participants 
on the respect of anonymity of information at all levels for respondents who wished it to be 
so. However, there were instances in which anonymity became justifiable. For example, I 
was tempted to mention the names and duty post of some individual or institution in order 
to answer my research question, but in other cases only the duty post of individual or 
institution is mentioned, without attributing any particular point of view or comment, 
thereby allowing the case itself to be identified. This will mean protecting the 
confidentiality of the specific individual or institution. Information obtained through 
interviews, participant observation, and empirical study was used to answer my research 
questions.  
 Data was collected and presented using a Venn diagram. . The analysis of the data was 
interpreted based on what the various actors had been saying, in both interviews and 
documents and participant observation of the level of participation of the various 
stakeholders.35The thesis applied the necessary prerequisite for institutionalizing 
Community based forest management (CBFM) in Cameroon relevant to the case study, by 
using Ostrom`s (1990) “Designed Principles”. Information relevant to the interaction of the 
governance processes, (at operational level), as well as the perception of the concerned 
farmers and stakeholders was evaluated.  
3.1 Interviews 
Given the resources available and the constrain on time, semi-structured interviews and 
focus group interviews were  used to obtain primary source data, and processed data was 
obtain from secondary sources. The unit of analysis was registered farmers who were 
beneficiaries of the community forest and lived within the village communities. A 
purposive sampling method was used to choose the informants form the targeted population 
in Bimbia. In purposive sampling, you decide the purpose you want informants to serve, 
and you go out to find some (Bernard, 2006:189).  
 The sample size comprised 22 registered farmers and 15 non- registered farmers in Bimbia. 
The non-registered farmers were mainly family members who lived with the registered 
farmers and equally benefited from the community forest. The reason for targeting them is 
to understand their views regarding awareness of the purpose, rules, and management 
process of the community forest. Out of the 37 farmers, 7 were females.  The sample was 
small and non-representative, and it was difficult to verify who actually was a registered 
farmer with the council. The study cannot be considered representative of the entire 
population of interest because the aim was not to make generalizations, but to find out the 
farmers awareness, and perceptions about the management process of the community 
forest.  Processed data was through books, articles, and journals.   
3.1.1 Interviews at the Council (BBNRMC) Head Office 
The Forest Manager, the Field Extension Officer, and a Volunteer worker were 
interviewed. This was done in the month of February 2011. Subsequent interviews were 
made by telephone in November 2012 and November 2013 to update data collected. I made 
the selection of interviewees based on the circumstances on the field. I used open ended 
                                                          
35 Interpretative Approaches are approaches in which you treat social action and human 
activity as texts. Interviews and observational data can be transcribed into written text for 
analysis (Huberman, 1994).  
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questions. It ensured flexibility in the nature and type of questions and the data obtained is 
much more difficult to analyse than with the case of close questions. 
 
 
Figure 2 Interview at the office (Author, 2011). 
3.1.2 Key Informants 
I interviewed the Sub-delegate for forestry, and the Sub-divisional officer for Limbe III Sub 
–division.36 I started by going to their offices and then booked an appointment to see them. 
Arranging for a time and day was not easy because of their busy schedule and after failing 
to see them once; I successfully arranged to see them after normal working hours the 
following day.  The aim was to obtain some important information which I could not get 
from a group, taking into consideration the fact that the villagers in Bimbia municipality are 
made up of natives and non-natives.  The selection of the interviewees was done by me 
based on their availability and the circumstances on the field. In all the cases I was 
requested to come back the next day. Arranging for the time of the meeting was not easy 
after one failure. But I succeeded to do the interviews after normal working hours. These 
interviewees are represented during management board meetings held by the council 
(BBNRMC). Generally it was difficult to obtain clear, updated, and documented 
information about the activities carried within this village community from state 
administrators.37 
 
3.1.3 Focus Group 
The technique involved the interviewer (the researcher) and more than one person. It is 
often interactive, having some common interest. The aim was to explore the attitude and 
feelings of the farmers. Also I had to corroborate certain facts which I think had already 
been established (but not to ask about other topics of a broader, open-ended nature). It is 
very flexible interview form. The council (BBNRMC) has a number of farmer-groups, 
amongst which include Feed the Nation, Mile 4; Unity Sisters, Mile 4; Good friends 
                                                          
36 Limbe III Sub-Division is an administrative /geographical location in the Fako Division, 
South-West Region, of Cameroon, West Africa. It stretches from Mbonjo, through Mandoli 
Island, Man O`War Bay, Chop Farm, and the three Bimbia villages (Bonangombe, 
Bonabile, and Dikolo), to Mabeta Fishing Port, Bamukong on the mainland and the Creeks. 
 
37 This is partly due to the absence of a proper documentation system, and the fact that the 
administrators need to get your questions on time and prepare their answers before an 
interview.  
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Livestock Farmers, Motowo; Limbe Farmers Association, Towe. 38The choice of group for 
the focus group interview was decided by the forest manager. The focus group interview 
composed of five registered farmers of the council. Three other farmers were part of the 
group, but had not registered with the council (BBNRMC).  I observed that the farmers had 
made their group leader a spokesperson, which limited the idea of getting the opinion of the 
group. Another issue I observed was the fact that some of the farmers, who kept silent 
during the focus group discussion, provided some valuable contributions during light 
refreshment. During this period, there was no dominance caused by power struggle among 
participants. The focus group interview was conducted in “Pidgin English” (language) and I 
did the interview manually, without the use of a recorder.  . At the end of the interview 
session, I kept the floor open for suggestions from the interviewee(s), on other persons to be 
interviewed as well as other sources of evidence. All the interviews were conducted in the 
month of February 2011 to March 2011 as well as June 2014. Phone interviews were made 
when I came back to Sweden in the month of November 2012 as well as November 2013 
and October 2014. 
3.2 Participant Observation and Transect Walk with Farmers 
 A transect walk was made with a guard on a bike. This permitted me to identify the 
boundaries of Bimbia village and to get an on the spot assessment of the resources in the 
forest. It was a moment also to share in the experiences of the farmers.  I was able to see 
what the people do, rather than rely on what they say they do (Evaluation Brief, 2008).   
 
Participatory  
 
3.3 Data Presentation and Analysis 
I did a demographic presentation of the sampled population in order to explore relevant 
relationship.  I categorized, analysed using percentages and labelled major themes.  For 
qualitative data analysis, I used content analysis and direct quotations of selected remarks 
from the interviewees`. Findings were reported based on the research questions and 
objectives. The analysed data are the basis for discussion and conclusion.  
 
I used a Venn diagram 39to represent social relationships among stakeholders and where 
desired, power differences and influences between them. I used it to illustrate the extent to 
                                                          
38 Farmer- groups are a collection of farmers within their quarters, forming a union with the 
aim of promoting the interest of farmers. 
39 Venn diagrams represent structures or relationships amongst organizations and how they 
are perceived in communities. The different circles indicate the importance of each 
 
Figure 3 Interview with farmers during transect walk (Author, 2011). 
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which the different institutions within the village communities interact with each other or 
overlap in power struggle. It is a visual tool that helps participants to explore social 
relationship between stakeholders (Pretty et al, 1995). The Venn diagram was arrived at 
after carrying out interviews and focused group discussion with some of the workers of the 
council (BBNRMC). 
3.4 Limitation 
The study emphasized the agreement between the management council (BBNRMC), and 
the state contained in the Simple Management Plan (2002 to 2027) All key informants were 
interviewed, and the study was restricted to one focus group interview out of 11 farmer 
group.   It was difficult on the field to identify registered farmers, so I had to rely on the 
sincerity of farmer group leaders.40 Most of the respondents spoke in “Pidgin English” 
which required that I translate into English. In spite of the challenges got on the field, I was 
able to get responses to research questions, which formed the basis for my conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
organization to the community. The proximity of the circle illustrates how much interaction 
between the actors is going on.  It was developed by John Venn. 
www.sswminfo/content/venn-diagram. 
40 The   circumstances of the meeting with the farmers did not permit me to verify proof of 
registration, though some had registered but were not regular with their dues judging from 
the registers in the BBNRMC office. 
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4 Background and study area 
 
4.1 Context of forest Act and its Implementation.  
This section discusses the institutional history and development of forestry legislation in 
Cameroon. 
4.1. 1.  Institutional History and Development of Forestry Legislation in Cameroon.   
Cameroon forestry reform started during the German colonization (1884-1914) period, and 
it was shaped during the joint British and French mandate (1919-1960), and later extended 
into the period after independence. During this periods, the forestry reforms was 
characterised by a legal and absolute control of the state over the country`s forest lands 
(Achu, 2009). The local communities living within the forest lands were in some way, 
excluded by an ownership system and property regime that only recognized their right of 
extraction (Diaw, 2005; Oyono, 2005; Jum and Oyono, 2005) During the German rule, the 
forest lands were managed and exploited by a tenure system based on collective ownership, 
by the family lineage and clan (Diaw et al, 1997) Later, the land tenure system was 
different in British and French zones. (Diaw and njomkap, 1998). In British Cameroon, the 
local people were considered as owners of land and   the reserves were managed by the 
colonial authorities through the traditional councils, while in French Cameroon, the colonial 
authorities controlled both lands and reserve and were considered as state ownership (Diaw 
et al, 1997); Bigombe, 1996). Both cases had different management systems, and the local 
population had only limited rights of use (Diaw et al, 1997).  
After independence (1960-1985), the government of Cameroon introduced successive 
laws governing forest and land (Forest Order No 73/18 of May 25, 1973, Land Tenure and 
State Lands order No 74-1 and 74-2 of july 6, 1974; Forestry law No. 81/13 of December 
27, 1981) (RoC, 1994, 1981).  
  
 During the  1980s, the forestry law lacked an adequate legal framework for planning land 
use, integrating forest protection, and production activities as well as agriculture. Under the 
land tenure law (1974 land Ordinance ), usufruct rights permitted anybody to clear and 
cultivate land in state forests, since by planting crops, a settler obtained a right to remain on 
the land for the thirty or so years of the life of his crop, and as such gained de facto 
possession of the land.  
Under this forestry law, the Prime minister had sole discretion over the allocation of 
logging concession, while the minister in charge of forests was responsible for granting 
smaller “cutting rights”. Life concessions were given for periods of five years, renewable 
on the basis of request submitted by the forest industry. Allocation of concessions was done 
by mutual agreement between the timber companies and the government authorities (Brown 
et al, 2002). This resulted in rent seeking by the public and private sectors.  During this 
period, forestry laws were not fully respected because forestry was a small component of a 
bigger Ministry of agriculture and its impact could not be appreciated by the legislation  
With all these inconsistencies, the government recognized that the situation in this sector 
was becoming unbearable. In an effort to improve the management of the forests and 
protect natural resources, and with full support of the World Bank, it decided to handle the 
forest policy reform by improving forestry concessions and taxations policies (Ekoko, 
2000, Brunner et al, 2000).  It was evident that, if the way forestry concessions were 
awarded, taxed and enforced, the government could prevent the worst environmental 
damage and reap enough revenue to deal with its most pressing social and economic 
problems. (Ekoko, 2000).  
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In 1987, there was a review of the Cameroon forestry legislation as part of the Tropical 
Forestry action Plan (TFAP).41 The adoption of a new forestry law was considered as part 
of the conditionality for the structural adjustment loan made by the World Bank to 
Cameroon.  
 
A new forestry law was established by presidential Decree 94/436/PM in January 1994, as 
the main law that governs the forestry sector in Cameroon.  The objective was furthermore 
to decentralize forest management and establish a tenurial right of communities over the 
resource. The 1994 forest law was also intended to regulate the relationship between the 
state and other stakeholders groups such as the concessionaries,42 private forest owners, 
communes, forest communities, and industries involved in the management, harvesting 
processing and commercialization of forest products (FAO, 2003).  
Associated to this law is the 1995 decree no 95/531/PM,  to determine the conditions for the 
implementation of forestry regulations (GoC, 1995) In addition , in 2002, the creation of the 
digitalized Forest Management Information System (SIGIF) also plays an important role in 
the implementation of the law.  The finance law determines the annual basis, the tax rate for 
different activities (such as Felling Tax, Royalty for forest Area9 (Amariei, 2005). 
 
4.1.2. Institutional Description of the Implementation process of law 94/01. 
The action arena43 in this study area is Bimbia Bonadikombo community forest (BBCF). 
This is the unit and focus of investigation.  This is where the farmers and the local 
authorities are experiencing the spread of the farms.  The arena stretches to the BBNRMC, 
Limbe III municipality, and village communities. The actors 44 who participate in the 
management process interact through the council (BBNRMC) which has a management 
board.  The village communities participate also in the management process during general 
assembly meetings. During such meetings, discussions on institutional processes, 
governance strategies, participations of different user groups, conflicts and vested interest 
of different stakeholders are analysed and evaluated.  External actors in this action arena 
include Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as Mount Cameroon Project 
(MCP). This NGO, in connection with the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 
empowers and strengthens the skills of the council (BBNRMC) members on sustainable 
forest management.   MCP organises training workshops in key areas such as leadership 
skills, institutional restructuring, and negotiation skills.  
 
 The action situation 45 in the following villages (Bonadikombo, Bonabile, Bonagombe, 
Lawanda and Dikolo) are (the management board of the council (BBNRMC), general 
                                                          
41 TFAP was formulated to conserve tropical forest. It was devised in 1987 by UN agencies, 
the World Bank, and the World Resource Institute in response to the crisis of tropical 
deforestation (FAO, 1985, World Resources institute, 1985).  
42 A forest concessionary is a person or a firm with a contract or license or permit to extract 
and market timber or other produce commercially from a defined area of forest within a 
given period. http://dictionaryofforestry.org. 
43 The action arena exists in the home, the neighborhood, local, regional, national and 
international councils, in firms and markets. The arena interacts with others.  
44 An actor is the individual or group functioning as a corporate actor, who takes action. 
They include the forest manager, mayor, chiefs, government officials, village elites, donor 
organizations. Actors are characterized by the following features, “the preference 
evaluations that actors assign to potential actions and outcomes, the way actors acquire, 
process, retain and use knowledge contingencies and information, the selection criteria 
actors use for deciding upon a particular course of action, and the resources that the actors 
bring to a situation” (p.33). 
 
45  An action situation is the “social space where individuals interact, exchange goods and 
services, engage in appropriation and provision activities, solve problems, and fight”. It 
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assembly meetings, farmers and others user groups unions, Limbe traditional councils, the 
family , and the courts) where  interactions in formal and informal rules and behaviours of 
the actors  in the working environment are evaluated.  The interactions in rules and 
decisions sometimes overlap with other arrangements, or disrupt agreed objectives, or 
offset gains from cooperation.  The peaceful stability experienced in these communities is 
thanks to the efforts of the Divisional officers, the mayors, the chiefs and their 
collaborators, in maintaining law and order in these different villages. Within the BBCF, 
the different actors have vested interest in the forest resources and land, so they try to 
integrate their different powers and values at different decision making levels. For example, 
the farmers have a representative at the management board. So the farmers rate the 
interactions of rules based on their involvement during management meetings as well as the 
adequacy of decisions taken in their favour.   
 
The action situation here is that, due to the heterogeneous increase in population in this 
locality, there is a high demand for farms. The spread of farms has become a threat to the 
sustainable use of the forest, as well as to power holders involved in decision making. 
While officials of the municipality belief that the forest manager and the Operation 
Committee Members, have not enforced the right rules or  mechanisms to check the spread 
of the farms and protect the conservation zone, the Operations Committee Members believe 
that, the process of creating a municipal council without adequate provision for livelihood 
options, has attracted population settlement. As a consequence, there is a higher demand for 
livelihood needs such as food and shelter. The registered farmers within the BBNRMC also 
belief that the traditional governance approach to farming in their respective villages 
(where access rights to forest resources is free) should be   similar to that practiced within 
the community forest.  
 
In the process of implementing Law 94/01, the central government devolves responsibilities 
to the Limbe III municipality partly because they are believed to perform these 
responsibilities more efficiently. The municipality designs a plan of action to ensure that 
BBNRMC carries out its activities according to the Simple Management Plan.  As at the 
time of writing, there were conflicts amongst the municipality officials, the management 
council (BBNRMC) staffs, the Delegate for forestry, and the Sub-Divisional Officer for 
Limbe III Sub-Division,   over roles and responsibilities. It was necessary to clearly define 
boundaries and forest property rights. The behaviour of each of the actors in BBCF can be 
explained in terms of a set of contextual factors that the IAD framework classifies as 
follows: 1) Physical conditions, 2) Community attributes 3) Local institutional 
arrangements.   
 
4.1.2.2. .1 The Biophysical Environment46showing the nature of the good.   
 
This community forest is a Common Pool Resource47 with individuals reaping benefits and 
incurring cost to get outcomes.  As a CPR, human institutions are needed to prevent a 
“Tragedy of the commons outcome”, in which individual forest users pursue their narrowly 
defined self-interest which ultimately destroys the resource (Geof Glass, 2001).  
                                                          
includes the following elements, “participants in positions who must decide among diverse 
actions in light of the information they possess about how actions are linked to the potential 
outcomes and cost and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes” (p.29) 
46 The physical world varies from setting to setting and for forest ecosystems might include 
elements such as rate of growth, diversity of species present, climate and weather, and other 
physical factors that impact the state of the forest ecosystem and humans that interact with 
it. Other elements include the size of the resource, temporal and special variability of 
resource units, current condition (Ostrom, 1990.p. 197) 
47 Common Pool Resources have attributes that make them easy to deplete and difficult to 
protect (Mc Kean, 2000).  
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 4.1.2.3. . Socio economic conditions and association of actors in forestry.  
 
Initially logging was carried out, destined for export by timber exploiters, and later small 
scale timber exploitation by chainsaw owners.48 The timber is used for furniture, building 
and roofing of houses in the various villages.  Examples of trees species exploited include 
Iroko, Mahogany, whitewood and Arafa. Presently the forest is under serious threat by 
farmers and timber exploiters due to exploitation and poor land use practice. 
The indigenes argue that before the community forest was established, the non-indigenes 
exploited the forest without permission from the traditional authorities. So the indigenes 
viewed the non- indigenous forest users as illegal squatters, and were desperate to regain 
control of forest lands (Nuesiri, O., 2014). So their motivation to cooperate with MCP 
Limbe, to form BBNRMC was to gain control of the lands.49 On the other hand, the non-
indigenous forest users argue that their involvement in the management is because of 
livelihood survival. One of the non-indigenous forest users argued that:  “Actually we do 
not have a voice, before and after the community forest was created…we go to the board 
meetings to hear what the bakweri authorities and some government representatives will 
say. We use the forest for farming, timber exploitation,  firewood collection, and charcoal 
production in order to survive….and if they stop us,  life will be very difficult” (Pa Philip, 
personal communication, 26th May 2014).  
One of the indigenous elite and a member of the management board made the following 
remarks: “When the idea of creating a community forest was introduced, what immediately 
came to our   minds was control of the forest land on behalf of ourselves, our children and 
grandchildren. We did not have the means to oust the non-indigenes from illegally using 
our land. So control was our priority, and we will do everything not to lose the land again.” 
(Mola Luma, personal communication, 13th march 2013) 
 
In an effort to control the forest resources and prevent deforestation, the council carries out 
the following activities as stated by Mr Ngale, (the coordinator for the farmers) : 
 “Our implementation process is in consistent with the Simple Management Plan (SMP) 
and it is for   five years. For example in the agro-forestry sector in Luanda, we identified 
degraded areas, identified tree species to be planted, developed the tree nursery, and 
maintained the nursery. Our aim is to maintain the soil and water for sustainable 
production of forest” The functional linkage in this process is that, rules contained in the 
SMP are applied to prevent deforestation within the community forest.  
  
                                                          
48Recently the administration has raised worries over the alarming rate of the unauthorised 
and unsustainable exploitation of the Bimbia forest by some unscrupulous individuals. 
According to the Mayor (while addressing councillors of the Limbe III council during the 
budgetary session to examine and adopt the 2015 budget), this illegal exploitation of the 
forest is carried out through organised net-work using the names of some prominent 
personalities in the municipality to cover their actions. Based on this fact, the mayor stated 
that the excuse for cutting down trees to construct houses will not be tolerated as there has 
not been any significant infrastructural development in Bimbia in recent years. He lamented 
that the council does not benefit from forest royalties. He pointed out that, the Bimbia forest 
is under state protection and has been earmarked under UNREDD Programme as a potential 
forest to receive funding.  
  
49 The Bakweri interest in land control is related to the negative impact of the slave-trade, 
the history of protest and struggles against forceful land expropriation from the Bakweri for 
commercial plantations from the colonial era to date (Bakweri Land Committee, 1948; 
Ardener, and Warmington, 1960; Kofele-Kale, 2007; Baye and Epo, 2012; Oyono, 2013). 
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In the area of Agro-forestry, the council carries out farmer education programs on 
sustainable farming practices with the assistance from Mount Cameroon Project. The 
council has equally created a fuel wood plantation to reduce pressure on the forest and a 
Nursery for nursing of seedlings of timber species.  
 
 
Another challenge with regards to the management process is the fact that there is some 
high degree of social differentiation amongst the actors in Bimbia Bonadikombo 
community, which is embedded in inequalities of power, status, and wealth. This has 
influenced the allocation of farmland, fishing resources and opportunities within the 
community forest. This social differentiation is based on ethnicity (Natives and non-
natives). This differentiation is as a result of the mentality, lifestyle, level of exposure, 
education, and the capacity to farm. During the focus group discussion, one of the farmers 
tried argued that “the inequality in power relations and status is because some of the 
villagers and farmers have relatives working with the government, holding prominent 
positions that exert power in their favour with regards to decisions concerning uses of 
forest resources. Some of the village elites are politicians with the ruling party (CPDM) in 
Cameroon, and this gives them power at the local level (Focus group discussion, 2011). 
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Figure4.   Map shows BBCF boundary with land cover showing dense forest, open forest, mangroves, 
farmland, settlement, plantation, water. (Source: Mor Achankap Bakia, GIS UNIT, Programme for 
Sustainable Management of Natural Resources, MINFOF, S.W.R.Cameroon.) 
 Beekeeping is practiced by farmers as a way of diversifying farming activities. In some 
parts of the forest, Bee hives have been constructed and installed and monitoring is in 
process. The council (BBNRMC) also carries out restoration of degraded areas and 
reforestation of the forest. Trees are planted to prevent landslides and to increase the soil 
fertility. The operations committee members also carry out regular monitoring of the 
conservation zone. In the process regular seizure of illegally harvested and distributed 
timber, firewood and charcoal is collected. The workers destroy wildlife traps and they 
prevent farm encroachment and poor farming practices.  The BBCF is equally used for 
touristic purposes (Eco-tourism). The forest has a mangrove, a rain forest and some 
historical sites which are very interesting touristic attraction.  
 
4.1.2.4.    Rules-in- use within the local institutional arrangements.   
 
The rules50 applied in the village community include constitutional laws enshrined in the 
constitution of the Republic of Cameroon,  law No 94/01  on forestry, wildlife and fisheries 
regulation,  collective decision-making rules implemented by the municipality (Here 
decision makers create rules to impact the operational level activities), Operational level 
rules enshrined in Simple Management  Plan  for Bimbia Bonadikombo Community forest 
for the period 2002-2027, and most especially traditional rules, norms and customs applied 
at local levels.  In the process of implementing law 94/01, certain rights need to be 
respected. These rights include mainly the customary and logging user rights. As stated in 
the management plan of 2001, members of the community have the following rights with 
permission from the council: (1) Single tree felling rights for local construction. (2) 
Commercial fuel wood exploitation rights. (3)  Rights for all types of hunting.  
Without seeking permission from the council, the members of BBCF have :(1) The right to 
use fuel wood for subsistence. (2) The right to fish. (3) Traditional rights, rights for village 
harmony, sacrifices.  (4) The right to collect NTFP`s for consumption. It should be noted 
that the community must inform the council of any activity carried out in the forest 
(BBNRMCMP, 2001) 
 Recently the Limbe III council through the Mayor raised worries about illegal exploitation 
of the forest carried out through organised net-work. Based on this fact, the administration 
curtailed certain rights of forest users by  stating that the excuse for cutting down trees to 
construct houses will not be tolerated as there has not been any significant infrastructural 
development in Bimbia in recent years. The mayor lamented that the council does not 
benefit from forest royalties. He pointed out that, the Bimbia forest is under state protection 
and has been earmarked under UNREDD Programme51 as a potential forest to receive 
funding. Thus, it is incumbent on the council to sustainably manage the forest.52  
                                                          
50Rules as earlier mentioned, are statements about what actions are “required, prohibited, or 
permitted and the sanctions authorized if the rules are not followed” (p.38). Rules are 
created by humans, and are used to solve problems. In BBB, formal and informal rules and 
enforcement mechanisms are the rules in use.  
51 UNREDD Programme is the United Nations collaborative initiative on Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation. It is an effort to create a financial 
value for the carbon stored in forest, offering incentives to developing countries to reduce 
emissions from forested land and invest in low carbon paths to sustainable development. 
www.UN-redd.org. 
52 Illegal forest exploitation increase in Bimbia. Cameroon Tribune, Regional News, 7th 
January 2015. 
Figure 4 Picture etract taken by researcher, showing BBCF compartments and activities e.g illegal and timber 
exploitation, illegal charcoal exploitation, farm encroachment (Source: GIS UNIT, LIMBE TOTANICAL 
GARDEN; 2005). 
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4.2 Study Area 
This research was carried out in Bimbia Bonadikombo Village Community, in the Limbe 
III municipality in Cameroon. Cameroon is found in Central Africa and has a total Surface 
area of about 475440 sq. km.   Close to 70% of the population are involved in agriculture 
(Minang, 2007).   
 
4.2.1. The Limbe III municipality 
This municipality has its headquarters in Bimbia, a small colonial coastal village, which 
was formerly along a slave -trade route. The municipality is located in Limbe III Sub-
Division. The boundaries of the municipality stretch to the East and North by Tiko Council 
and Ombe River, to the west by Limbe-One Council, and to the south by the Atlantic 
Ocean. The municipality is headed by a mayor,53 and assisted by a secretary general who is 
appointed by the state, to be in charge of staff and general administration of the council.54 
Some of the villagers in this municipality are plantation workers with the Cameroon 
Development Corporation (CDC), others are “Petit traders”55, but most of the villagers are 
farmers and fishermen. The majority are involved in forest extraction activities such as 
timber exploitation, charcoal burning, fuel wood collection, hunting and collection of 
NTFP.  
Important actors in this municipality are the “traditional authorities”. The village chiefs are 
custodian of the tradition. The chieftaincy   system is hereditary, although the local 
population often contest the legitimacy of successors. 56 In this municipality, the Sub-
Divisional Officer for limber III is a key actor, who represents the state and is equally 
appointed by the central administration.57 During my visit to the municipality, he 
commented: 
“My ministry is the Ministry of Territorial Administration. So I deal with all aspects of 
management of natural resources, Infrastructure, local economic development, and 
security. I equally liaise with the local population through the traditional chiefs.  I 
supervise elections (Municipal, Legislative and Presidential). I do not directly manage the 
community forest.  The council (BBNRMC) is in charge of the management, through the 
forest manager and the management council. But where there is incompetence or lack of 
capacity on the part of the council (which is often the case) to take decisions on time and 
enforce them, or in case of conflict or violation of the law, the administration has to step in 
                                                          
53 The mayor is elected by the population and is responsible for the management of local 
finances and the collection of taxes within his municipality.  
54The municipality stretches from Mbonjo, through Mondoli Island, Man O war Bay, Chop 
farm, Bonangombe, Bonabile, Dikolo, to Mabeta fishing port, Bamukong on the mainland 
and the creeks. It is believed that, this council was created to depend solely on revenue 
from BBNRMC. The municipality has 21 elected councilors. . www.limbe3council.org. 
55 In this thesis, “Petit Traders” refer to small scale buyers and sellers of goods or small 
scale providers of services, such as hairdressers,  
56 Some narratives are of the opinion that, Bimbia originally consisted of three villages, 
namely Dikolo, Bona ngombe, and Bona bile. Dikolo had six quarters, namely Mbeng`a 
Liwoka, Bali, Wona Wonanya, Wona ngowe and wona mbimbi and mabetefutu with their 
family heads and traditional chiefs. Some of these quarters today have grown into villages. 
Other villages have developed with migrant population. For example, Chop- farm or 
“Mbofi” village, made up mostly of people of the Meta tribe of the North West region of 
Cameroon. The Batangas from kribi came to Bimbia to fish with their families and were 
also given a beach called “Livo la Vatanga” meaning Batanga beach. In Dikolo, the 
Ekum`a Makunda  family have the chieftaincy, in Bona ngombe it is the Musuka family, 
and in bona bille it is the Billa Lozenge family who have it, the descendants of king 
William of Bimbia (Auntie Clara, personal communication, 7th January 2013). 
57 The Sub-Divional officer is directly supervised by the Divisional Officer for Fako 
Division. These officers are responsible for the implementation of administrative decisions 
within the Limbe III sub-Division.  
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to rectify the situation.   So very often, we liaise with the traditional authorities, and the 
forces of law and order, then harmonize decisions by preparing a “Prefectural Order” or a 
service note to enforce decisions. These are measures that we take to harmonize the law 
with the traditional authority system of governance” (The D.O., Limbe III council).  
 
 With regards to what challenges he faces as an administrator, the Sub-D.O. said stated: 
“My major challenge is in the area of constantly changing laws that sometimes, are in 
conflict with traditional norms and customs within the administrative locations, and 
frequent transfer of administrators, which makes it difficult for us as   administrators to 
resolve village disputes over land and resources during our tenure of service in the Sub-
Division”.  
 
Another respondent contacted within the municipality was the Sub –Divisional Delegate for 
forestry. With regards to the management of the forest, he   limited his argument to law No 
94/01, section 37 which refers to village communities and management. He said:  
” I do not manage the forest. The state simply has a supervisory role to see that the forestry 
law is implemented in line with the management agreement between the parties concern.  
But the cosmopolitan nature of limbe town and the nature of the population (natives and 
non-natives) make it difficult to regulate the use of forest resources for village communities 
that depend on farming as a major source of income.  He emphasized cooperation amongst 
the different villages in Bimbia and the state services in charge of forest. He argued that 
according to the agreement signed between the council (BBNRMC) and the state, the 
service in charge of the forest (MINIFOF) is expected to promote the management of the 
forest by providing free technical assistance to all the village communities. 
 
 With regards to who should benefit from the forest resource, he used section 38 (1) which 
states that “Management agreement shall specify the beneficiaries and boundaries of the 
forest allocated to them”.He went further to say: 
 “I face a lot of challenges because the council (BBNRMC) lacks some technical, legal and 
financial capacity to enforce the law. We have trained forest guards who offer assistance in 
the area of monitoring.”  With regards to technical challenges, he added that, “Some 
agricultural products are equally NTFP, and the law does not clearly make this distinction. 
But my office is aware that farmers face harassment by our forest guards who try to 
regulate the use of forest resources. We are often described as corrupt, but that is not 
always the case. We have to deal with inconsistencies and deficiencies in systems, but we 
must not neglect the human elements in governance.  In addition what the law defines as 
protected species varies with time”. 
 
The   distinction (between agricultural products and NTFP) is necessary because section 8 
of the law 94/01  defines customary right as the right which is recognised as being that of 
local people to harvest all forest, wildlife and fisheries products for personal use except the 
protected species. With regards to the beneficiaries of the  forest resources within the 
community,  he referred me also to the Simple Management Plan for BBCF for the period 
2002-2027, chapter 1,  section III,  that spells out the villages (Bonadikombo, Bonabile, 
Bonangombe, Lawanda, Dikolo) in which the community legal entity is located. 58 
                                                          
58 During creation, the management agreement mentioned five villages as beneficiaries of 
the community forest. The challenge of the BBNRMC was to extend the community legal 
entity to the other villages that have developed. According to Nuesiri,(2014), income 
generated from the community forest is used to pay its workers and to cover operational 
cost. There is little evidence to show that the institution has been able to fund collective 
social development projects. Revenue is raised from permits on forest operations, sales of 
forest products, projects, grants, and donations. The staff and forest management officer are 
paid from this money. See constitution of BBNRMC, article 8(ii). 
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4.2.2  Bimbia Bonadikombo Community Forest (BBCF) 
The 1994 forestry law makes provision for village communities within forestry zones to 
establish community forest59 under a decentralized forestry system.  A community forest 
can only be set up in an area where the village communities have customary rights (Oyono 
et al, 2007). The BBCF is situated in the eastern part of Limbe town. The forest is 3735 
hectares in size, and it is boarded to the north by Mandolin, through Mile four and Tomaton 
behind Moliwe-CDC palms plantation.  
 
Yearly rainfall is between 4000mm to 5000mm per annum. A short dry-season is normally 
experienced in the months of December and February. Humidity in the area is usually 
between 75-80 degrees (Minang 2007).  The forest is dominated by six vegetation types. 
These are lowland rainforest, stream and riverside vegetation, fresh water swamp forest, 
mangrove coastal bar forest and littoral vegetation. The multiple vegetation type in Bimbia 
accounts for its rich diversity of plant species with high conservation importance. (Bimbia 
Bonadikombo Community Management Plan, 2001). 
 
 
 
                                                          
59”1995 forestry Decree defines a community forest as “a forest forming part of the non-
permanent forest, which is covered by a management agreement between a village 
community and the forests administration”. Management of such forests is the 
responsibility of the community concerned, with the help or technical assistance of the 
forest administration” (Egbe, 2001). In this paper as well,  “Community Forestry”  is 
regarded as “those opportunities available for local communities to participate in the 
management, preservation and sustainable exploitation of forest resources upon which their 
livelihood is based 
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Figure 5 Map showing BBCF boundaries  with contours 20m interval, showing farmland, open forest, 
dense forest, settlement rivers, mangroves (Source: Mor Achankap Bakia, GIS UNIT: PSMNR, 
MINFOF, S.W.R. Cameroon) 
The forest is experiencing loss of wildlife. Drills (mandrillus Leucophaeus) are said to have 
extirpated in the early 1980s. Wildlife species are under pressure from illegal hunters 
include; cane rat, viper, monitor lizard, squirrel etc. Species such as antelope, pangolin, 
tortoise African- rock, and python are considered locally extinct 
 
Part of the land of the community forest is on long-term lease from the state. From 1988-
1991, the Limbe Botanic and Rainforest Genetic Conservation Project (LBGRCP) 
demarcated the boundaries of the forest after a reconnaissance visit, and botanical inventory 
was done in 1992. Timber exploitation has evolved and species exploited include; Iroko, 
Mahogany, White wood, Afara. The demand for charcoal has increased since the past 
sixteen years and the community exploits Non-timber forest products (NTFP) for home use. 
NTFPs found in the forest include spices such as bush pepper, eru, biter cola (Garcinia), 
bush mango (Irvingia gabonensis).   
 
Historically, traditional rites are carried out in certain parts of the forest. Certain places are 
used as burial grounds.60 A variety of plants are collected from the forest, and used for 
treatment of common illnesses such as malaria, typhoid, epilepsy etc.  Visiting research 
institutions (Smithsonian Institution and African Rattan research Programme) have 
undertaken scientific studies on tree growth in the forest.  
4.2.3 History of Bimbia  
In the 18th Century, the settlers around Bimbia were predominantly bakweri tribes (Watts, 
1994). According to ethnographers, the indigenous tribes are known as Isubu.  They settled 
primarily in the littoral region and shared a common ancestry with indigenous batoke, 
wovia and balongs. Being a coastal tribe, they were amongst the first tribes to be exposed to 
                                                          
60The villager belief, sometimes having visitors pass by old gravesites may not be 
respectful to the ancestors of the village. 
 34 
colonial rule.61 Due to rich volcanic soil in this area, it became an important German station 
after the establishment of the Kameron protectorate in 1884. Germans confiscated native 
lands for large scale commercial agriculture.62 
 
1914,  the bakweri protested to the German imperial government against their confiscated 
land, but corrective measures were aborted by the outbreak of the First World War world. 
After the war the German planters returned to continue to exploit the land. 
 
In 1939, World War II broke out. The ex-German plantations again became Enemy 
Property, and the British Colonial Government, under United Nations (U.N) Trusteeship, 
through the Governor –General of Nigeria, representing the British Government as Trustee 
(due to protest from Bakweri Land Claim Committee, both to the United Nations and the 
British Administrative Authority), bought back all German estates from the custodian of 
Enemy Property, and declared the land “Native Lands” under Lands and Native Rights 
Ordnance, and created the Cameroon Development Corporation (C.D.C) in 1946. This was 
after due consultations with indigenous bakweries, who had been dispossessed of their 
land.63  
 
Based on the Bakweri Land Claim (BLC)64 petition (dated 24th August 1946) to the 
Governor of Nigeria requesting for the return of over 580 square miles of land which were 
alienated by German Government during their administration of the area, and sold or leased 
as plantations, or retained as Crown lands, the British Colonial Government reacted. 
 
On 9th June 1948, the United kingdom observations on the BLC petition were forwarded to 
the Secretary-General of the UN, in which was pointed out that all lands had been declared 
native lands and had been placed under the Governor of Nigeria to be administered for the 
use and common benefit of the natives; that the Nigerian Government had repurchased 
14,851 acres of plantation land for the benefit of the natives, and that CDC had been set up 
to administer and develop the plantations until such time as the bakweri people were 
competent to manage them without assistance.65 
 
In the 50s and 60s farms were opened in parts of the forest, especially Southern Bimbia.66  
Due to semi-urban and heterogeneous setting of this community, the native authorities had 
                                                          
61 There are conflicting narratives about the origin of the Isubu (also called Isuwu). It is 
generally believed that the settlement of Bimbia was founded by Isuwu La Monanga, a 
native of Womboko. Due to ancestral ties between the Douala and Isuwu this version which 
may be termed the ”Douala version” rejects the Womboko connection. Dibussi, 
T.(2009).www.bakweri.com. 
62 Germans used coercion, brute force and repressive laws to force local indigenous communities to 
give up vast natives lands without compensation. http://www.blccarchives.org. 
63 http://www.blccarchives.org Review Principle of Derivation incorporated in Law No. 94-1, 
followed by decree No. 95/5317PM. Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) pays land rents in 
conformity with the HEAD LEASE AGREEMENT of December 29, 1960 between the Commissioner 
of Southern Cameroons and the C.D.C. (Registered on March 15 1961 as No. 42 at page 42 in 
Volume 24 of Lands Registry at Buea). http://wwwbakwerilands.org. 
 
64 Bakweri land Claim Committee created since World War II, campaigns for compensation 
for the restitution of land expropriated by germans at the end of 19th Century and taken over 
by Cameroon Government after reunification in 1961. www.blccarchives.org. 
65 1948 Petition of the Bakweri Land committee/ Cameroon under British Mandate. See AFRICA 
(Journal of the Royal African society), Vol. 18, No 4, October 1948, p.307). www.blccarchives.org. 
66 Since German colonization, main economic activity of the people of Bimbia has been  
fishing and farming. Communal labour was used by the men for it was not possible for one 
man to set up his fishing equipment. Fishing methods were namely “Ndemba, Ngoto, 
Mbuja, Efese and Moleke” and the raw material for the equipment came from the 
forest.Mangrove sticks were used to make “Ndemba” and building of canoes. The women 
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difficulties controlling and managing the forest.67 In an effort to regulate exploitation of 
forest resources, his Royal Highness, late chief Ferguson Manga Williams, former 
Paramount chief of Limbe collaborated with other chiefs and the natives, created two 
institutions. The Victoria Lands and Forest Conservation Committee (VLFCC), to monitor 
developments in the forest, and the Victoria Area Rainforest Common Initiative Group 
(VARCIG) in an effort to control and protect the forest.. . This idea was then welcomed by 
the Mount Cameroon Project, who later came in to help improve conservation in the area.  
 
In the 1990s, the country was in a crisis. The World Bank intervened with the Structural 
Adjustment Plan. The World Bank favoured Community Forest Management and the 
adoption of new forestry law, which was one of the conditions for receiving credits under 
the Structural Adjustments Plan (Etoungou, 2003, p.3).68  
 
In this process, Community forestry was introduced and the village community then 
worked with the Mount Cameroon Project (MCP) and Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry (MINEF) through the planning process until March 2002. (Minang, 2007). 
The Paramount chief, Village chiefs and Quarter heads (Leaders who control quarters 
within villages) constitute the hierarchy today. 
 
4.2.4 Bimbia Bonadikombo Natural Resources Management Council (BBNRMC)  
The BBNRMC is an association created on the 20th November 1998. This association has 
offices in the following villages: Bonadikombo, Bonabile, Bonangombe, Lawanda and 
Dikolo (Minang, 2007).  The council (BBNRMC) has a board, headed by a board chairman, 
with elected representatives, called Operations Committee Members (OCM).   Some of 
them are elected and others appointed in the following categories. The paramount chiefs 
and other chiefs are honorary members. Other members of the board include farmer69 
representatives, charcoal union representatives, representatives of timber exploiters from 
the south and north of Bimbia. The board equally has some ex-official members composed 
of the Government Delegate for Limbe Urban Council, the chairman of Limbe Urban 
Council, the Divisional Delegate of the Ministry of forest and fauna, the Divisional Officer 
of Limbe, the Sub- Divisional Officer of Limbe III, and the Mayor of Limbe III 
municipality, Forces of law and Order and the forest manager. Other external actors could 
be representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) like Mount Cameroon 
Project (MCP).  
 
                                                          
grew yams, and used NTFP for cooking as well as to dry the fish (Clara, Y., personal 
communication, 7th January 2013). 
67 There are overlapping and complex land ownership claims to Bimbia forest. Most of the 
forest lies on CDC leasehold land. The local people too have ancestral claims to the land 
while most of the western part is being occupied by settler farmers with little or no claim to 
the land but believe it is government land so they have a right to access (Nuesiri,2008) 
68 Etoungou (2003) argues that at this time the list of Cameroon`s National Environmental Laws and 
Decrees had grown continuously since the signing of the conventions on climate change and 
biodiversity in Rio de Janeiro at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 
1992. These include: Decree No 92/069 of April 9th 1992, creating the Ministry of the Environment 
and Forestry; Law No 94/01 of January 20th 1994, establishing forestry, wildlife and fisheries 
regulation; Law no 96/12 of August 5th , 1996, establishing the framework for environmental 
management; Decree No 94/259/PM of May 31, 1994 creating the National Consultative Commission 
for the Environment and Sustainable Development; Decree No 95/466 of July 20th 1995, establishing 
the procedure for the application of wildlife regulations; Decree No 95/531 of August 23th 1995, 
establishing the procedure for the application of forestry regulations; Decree No 96/224 of October 1st 
1996, establishing the reorganization of MINEF; Decree No 94/167 of August 29th 1994, ratifying the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biodiversity. 
69. These farmers live close to one another, have a similar heritage or culture and speak 
“bakweri” as their native language. Some of them are natives while others are non-natives 
from neighbouring countries such as Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon etc. 
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As regards specific actor experiences within the council, it was observed that the forest 
manger had not been installed and this gave a negative impression of the implementation 
process of the law. The perception of the council staff was that, the forest officer had not 
been fully empowered to carry out his functions. To the farmers, they believed they belong 
to a council that has a weak leadership, and therefore does not merit their confidence. I also 
observed that failure by the administration to empower (Install) the Forest Manager, 
questions the real intentions of the legislative body and the administration with regards to 
community forestry..70 The forest officer equally stated in his comments that: “The weak 
participation of farmers within the community forest council is partly because roles are not 
properly defined, and there is growing pressure by farmers, in need of farms, but most of 
the farmers do not respect the rules within the community forest”. 71 Article (4) of the 
constitution was cited, which describes the Management Council as having more 
representation of government officials as members. This to him does not give the farmers 
the capacity and audacity to influence and share control with other authorities. 
 
 The council (BBNRMC) emphasizes a bottom-up management system approach to forest 
resources within the community forest (BBNRMCMP, 2001). The emphasis on community 
forest participation (CFP) in forest management at local level is a major challenge to power 
holders in the decision making process of forest management.  “There are no relations of 
power without possible resistance” (Foucault, 1979).  The BBNRMC has a composition 
that is 70% indigenous and 30% non- indigenous (Nuesiri, 2007).72 The BBNRMC in 
consultation with indigenous community members, stakeholder groups, the Ministry of 
Environment and Forest in Limbe, drew up the Management Plan. The Mount Cameroon 
Project (MCP) provided funding and technical support, and equally played a facilitator`s 
role in the drawing up of the Management Plan.  All activities carried out by the BBNRMC 
must comply with the Management Plan. The management plan has duration of 25 years.  
The plan focuses on sustainable management objectives which include:  
- To maintain bio-diversity and generate income through non-consumptive use of the 
forest for financial sustainability, and re-investment into forest management 
activities. 
- To conserve bio-diversity and carry out research while providing sustainable 
livelihoods at subsistence level 
- To enrich forest with useful species while providing fuel energy to the community. 
- To carry out reforestation and maintain soil and water for sustainable production of 
forest products 
- To raise income through sustainable timber exploitation, support livelihoods and 
enrich highly degraded areas. 
 
                                                          
70 The Management Council of BBNRMC appoints staff on recommendation by the board. 
The Paramount chief and other chiefs are the chairmen and vice chairmen of the BBNRMC. 
The management council appoints a forest manager, subject to approval by the 
administration (Government). See constitution of BBNRMC Article 4. 
71 The Limbe III council is responsible for democratic local governance within the 
community. Their elected councilors are often at logger-heads with BBNRMC staff over 
roles and responsibility. There is need for harmonization of authority and responsibilities 
between Limbe III council and BBNRMC.  
72 According to Nuesiri, (2008), indigenes are comparatively over-represented in decision –
making over community forest, while non-indigenes are under-represented. The 
management board is composed of Bakweri (30.8%), Bimbia ((38.46%), Northwest 
(15.38%), West (3.9%), government (11.54%). Indigenes are opposed to giving a stronger 
voice in decision making to North westerners due to historic relations of selfdom and 
contempory struggle for political supremacy in Anglophone Cameroon.  
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The law 94/01 stipulates that if the forest is poorly managed, the management agreement is 
suspended (Oyono, 2005). 73 In the course of implementing law 94/01, the outcomes   of 
decisions are a reflection of interactions with norms and traditional governance approaches 
of the actors.  
 
 
                                                          
73 Note that, the law does not state the criteria for accessing the performance of the 
management process. 
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5 Findings  
5.1 (1) How does the implementation process of forest law 94/01 
affect forest management in Bimbia Bonadikombo Community 
(BBC)?(2) How do the farmers react to and perceive the 
implementation of law 94/01?   
In this section, I describe my findings using designed principles for governance of 
successful Community –Based Natural Resource Management by Ostrom (1990).  The 
choice of principles were selected based on review of law 94/01 and its 1995 Decree of 
Application, review of the Simple Management Plan (SMP) with regards to the forest 
management process, and their interaction with registered farmers of the council 
(BBNRMC).   
5.1.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries 
According to the findings from the field, the implementation process of 1994 law on   
Community Forestry Policy (CFP), fails to define what constitute a “community” (Egbe, 
2001; Nuesiri, 2008).74 It is not known if a community is a tribal or ethnic group, a village 
or the inhabitants of an administrative unit such as a sub- division (Egbe, 2001). This 
socio-political concept has been left to local interpretations who view community as an 
ethnic group (Nuesiri, 2008). The impact has been negative for the structuring of the BBCF 
farmer-registration and farm-rent problem.  During the focus group discussion, the farmers 
asked the following questions; “What farmers are targeted first for the registration 
process? Natives or non-natives?75 Where do the registration fees go? What steps make up 
the farmer registration process? For how long are we (farmers) going to farm? What type 
of technology are we going to use? How do we get material?” 
 
Section 38 of the law states that “the management agreements provided for in section 37 
shall specify the beneficiaries, the boundaries of the forest allocated to them, and the 
special instructions on management of areas of woodland and/or wildlife, formulated at the 
behest of the said communities”. A transect walk conducted by me, as well as analytical 
study of the Simple Management Plan (SMP) for the period 2002-2027,  permitted 
identification of some physical boundaries of the community forest.  
 
According to the Simple Management Plan for BBCF (2002-2027),76  a demarcation and 
survey of the proposed Community forest boundary was done originally by Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry (MINEF), and Mount Cameroon Project (MCP) after 
consultation with the natives. The core forest was demarcated with red paint, and 
demarcation of parts of the outer boundaries with yellow paint. The Simple Management 
Plan also states that, the community is composed of the following villages, Bonadikombo, 
                                                          
74 Forest Governance Challenge on Mount Cameroon. IHDP update. February 2008. Section 37(5) of 
the 1994 law states that, “Forest products of all kinds resulting from the management of the 
community forests shall belong solely to the village communities concern” (Nuesiri .E, 2008). 
75 In this thesis, the term “natives” refer to the indigenous tribes known as Isuwu or Isubu. 
Non-natives are non-indigenes of Isubu, and do not have ancestral ties with the Isubu, but 
are settlers in Bimbia Bonadikombo community from other parts of Cameroon and out of 
Cameroon.   
76 Simple management Plan (SMP) for BBCF is a document that describes the community, 
its location and priority use. It equally describes the forest and the action program for 2002-
2027. 
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Bonabile, Bonangombe, Lawanda, and Dikolo.77 During the focus group discussion, Mola 
Ngomba (Quarterhead and farmer at Dikolo village) commented that:  
 
“Prior to the law and mapping of boundaries, there was conflict between native farmers 
and non-natives over forest resources and land use plan. We were ready with our chiefs to 
fight for what we believed was our right. But now we can discuss and negotiate boundary 
issues within the BBNRMCs located in each of our villages,.” 
 
I observed that prior to the law; there was no democratic institution that permitted   both 
natives and non-natives to participate in negotiations in conflict resolution over boundaries 
and forest resources. According to Mr Ngale (Coordinator for the farmers) on the issue of 
boundaries, he said: 
 “The boundaries of the forest are clearly defined, but I think there is still illegal occupation of 
farm land, and it is difficult to trace the roots. According to the Simple Management Plan 
(SMP), the core areas of the community forest are for eco-tourism and research.” 
  
 With regards to membership to the community, Mr Philip (one of the farmer group 
leaders) made the following remarks: 
 “We (farmers) have our Union, and each farmer is supposed to have at least one hectare of 
farm land. Each farm has a boundary, even though; we do have conflict sometimes, over 
boundaries. We are united as a group, both natives and non-natives” 
He went on to say in “pidgin English” that¸“Your neighbours fit cross, enter your farm, and 
steal your chop (food). When this happen, we report to the union, or council (BBNRMC), or 
to the chief or sometimes to the Divisional Officer (D.O) who will try to solve the problem”  
What he meant is that sometimes there are conflict due to theft or encroachment into farms 
of other farmers and when this happens, the cases are either solved within the farmers 
union, or reported to the village councils or sometimes to the Divisional officers .   
 Mr Ngale further stated that, “Based on farmer registration, over 80% of the registered 
farmers within the council (BBNRMC) are non-natives. There are private lands (with farms) 
owned by some private individuals (e.g. the Burnley `s and the Martin`s), then there is native 
lands (with farms), under the leadership of the chiefs, and there is the community forest under 
the leadership of the council (BBNRMC).The lack of clear-cut definition is an obstacle to 
implementing certain projects because of difficulties in constituting farmer groups and 
distinguishing them from other stakeholder groups for resource management.” 
 
I observed that the registered farmers of the council (BBNRMC), within their village 
communities, face the challenge of identifying and classifying farmers within their farmers 
` unions (composed of natives and non-natives).  It was difficult to resolve contradiction 
(between traditional family rights for example and a new but challenged organization?)78 
 
During the focus group discussion, the farmers expressed the view that,  the persons 
responsible for management and use of the forest resources were known “families lineage”, 
segments of lineage (which are often indistinguishable from the village, the neighbourhood 
or group of villages) and clans who were traditional bearers of authority, important 
persons who guarantee the respect of rights of access, allocation and succession in matters 
of land tenure or the use of forest resources (see Diaw et al., 1997). They did not know 
what place they will have in the present process? What institutional arrangements need to 
be made to neutralize any conflict of competence? I found out based on interview with the 
                                                          
77In this thesis, the composition of a community does not define the “nature of a 
community” according to Cameroonian law. Bimbia Bonadikombo Community Forest 
Management Plan (2002-2027), 2001-08-30, p.4. 
78 When a farmer who is a member of a Union dies, there are traditional family rights with 
respect to sharing of property which may not be in conformity with the rules of the newly 
formed organization. 
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farmers that they still believed in an unsolved land tenure contestation and they did not 
understand the fact that community forestry is non-permanent.79 In 1999, the Minister of 
environment clearly stated, “Lack of a clear cut-definition of community, is an obstacle to 
implementing 1994 forestry law” (MINEF, 1999).  
 
5.1.2 User Rights 
 
According to Mr Ngale (coordinator for farmers), User Rights is a big problem. He stated: 
“Farmers are supposed to pay their registration fee for farming in the community forest 
depending on what they (farmers) cultivate, about  sixteen thousand francs per annum.. (That is 
32 dollars). The farmers have their union. So farmers who are members of their union and have 
complied by paying their farmer registration dues and land rents do not face this problem. But 
some of the farmers bring in their relatives and friends who do not respect the rules of farming 
in the community forest. Traps that are recognized and the owners have complied with the rules 
are not destroyed. Also farming in the core area of the community forest is a breach of the 
Management Agreement.” 
When contacted by phone,  Mr Philip (a farmer)  commented  that one of the reason for mis-use 
of forest resources was because” information  about the use of forest resources, especially 
protected species around the “core area “was not open and available to all the farmer groups 
and that most farmers are not frequently updated about farming activities.” 
 
 Community User Rights provisions are respected more in their breach than in their 
observance (Egbe, 2001). Section 37(5) of the 1994 law states that, “Forest products80 of 
all kinds resulting from the management of the community forests shall belong solely to the 
village communities concern”. The 1994 forestry law has nationalized all genetic resources 
in the national territory.81 Without attempting any definition, section (11) of the law states: 
 “The genetic resources of the national heritage shall belong to the state. No one may use 
them for scientific, commercial or cultural purpose without prior authorization”.82  
 
Farmer’s interest in the community forest is mainly “customary rights”, clearly stated in the 
Simple Management Plan for the period 2002-2027. This includes the rights to freely 
harvest all forest, wildlife and fisheries products for their “personal use”, except protected 
species (SMP for BBNRMC, 2002-20027). 
 
I observed that all the law requires is justification for personal use. The law fails to state the 
ways and means by which such justification can be furnished and the period required 
showing proof of justification. This provision has been a source of confrontation between 
farmers and Operations Committee staff or forestry officials of the BBNRMC. This 
confusion serves as an instrument of indiscipline by some over-zealous Operations 
Committee members of BBNRMC, and even forestry officials, including protected area 
conservators. 
 
During focus group discussion, two other farmers complained as follows,  “Sometimes the 
Operations Committee Staff will seize our crops as “bush allowance” or even destroy our 
crops for offences committed without proper explanation and due compensation is not paid 
to the farmers after providing evidence to justify their case. Added to this is the fact that 
                                                          
79 Forest Governance Challenges on Mount Cameroon. IHDP update.2.2008. p.29 (Nuesiri .E, 2008). 
80 s (9)1. “Forest products shall comprise mainly wood and non-wood products as well as wildlife and 
fishery resources derived from the forest.” 
81 Genetic resources are defined by the s.5. of the Environmental Code of 5th August, 1996, as 
“animal or plant material of real or potential value”. 
82 The 1994 forestry law, s.11. 
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farms are not distributed equally amongst natives and non-natives and between men and 
women”.  In response to this situation Mr Ngale explained that, “Some of the farmers do not 
actually understand the purpose of the Community Forest, and the need to regularize their 
situation with the chiefs and the council (BBNRMC), that for farmers, who are not registered in 
the council (BBNRMC), the customary tenure system does not give uniform protection to natives 
and non-natives”.  
The Operations Committee staffs of BBNRMC argue that, “The villagers’ dependence on 
farming, and the heterogeneous population structure of Limbe, is the greatest threat to the 
implementation of sustainable and participatory forest management principle”.   
5.1.3 Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules and Local Conditions.  
The study found out that there is some agreement in the rules with regards to local, social 
and ecological conditions, especially with regards to distribution of benefits and cost. The 
agreement between the state and the villages is stated in a Simple Management Plan 
(SMP).83  Section 37(5) states that “forest products of all kinds resulting from the 
management of the forest shall belong solely to the communities concern”.  
 
I also observed that technical assistance offered the village communities by the forestry 
administration ought to be free (Section 37(1)). According to Mr. Ngale: 
 “We are still expecting technical equipment (Compass, GPS, motorbikes)84 which we applied 
for (through the Delegation for forestry) from the administration to be supplied to us 
(BBNRMC) free of charge. The Motorbike we got from Mount Cameroon Project is not useable 
again. Sometimes MINFOF is not responsive to our technical needs and the procedures to make 
requests and feedback is often not clear or too long”. . 
I observed that the farmers are faced with the challenge of agreement between certain rules 
and local conditions. For example, Mr. Philip (one of the farmers) clearly stated:  
“We (farmers) need a road to the market, so as to transport some of our crops from our farms”.  
Mr Ngale’s opinion to this statement was that: 
“The purpose of the community forest is for conservation and research, and the products from 
the farms are for personal consumption. If we take a look at the level of education of the 
farmers, habits and mentality, a farm to market road will be a breach of the purpose of farming 
within the community forest”.85 
When contacted on phone, Mr Ngale the coordinator for the farmers) describe the procedure to 
obtain a farm in the community forest. He said that: 
“Farmers are expected to make an application to the council, providing the relevant 
identification information and fee. Selection is based on first –come-first –serve, and after 
assessment of your file. If the application is granted, the farmers are expected to pay annual 
rents and an inspection fee called “Chu-ku-chu-ku” during boundary allocation.” 
I observed that some customary practice is applied in the farm allocation process, for example, 
the payment of “chu-ku-chu-ku” and involvement of competent council staff vested in the 
tradition and custom of the people during farm allocation.  He stated further that, “The 
procedure is known by the registered farmers groups and other stakeholder groups within the 
                                                          
83 SMP defines activities to be conducted in the community forest (CF), and conditions under which 
the rights of use are to be exercised. 
84(1) A compass is an instrument for finding direction with a needle that always points to the north 
(Definition from the Oxford Advanced Learner`s Dictionary). (2) GPS means Global Positioning 
System. It can be used to store data for use in Geographical Information System (GIS) and map 
making. It is a satellite navigation system used to determine ground position and velocity (location, 
speed, and direction). 
85 I observed that the farmers need a road to facilitate movements to and from their farms, but not a 
farm to market road. 
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council (BBNRMC).   The procedure is not made public, but the tenure practice protects the 
farm (Land) rights of the registered farmer groups and their families. 
5.1.4 Minimum Recognition of Rights to Organize 
The concept of community forest as conceived by the legislature is not a wholesale transfer 
of rights in property, but a transfer of management, that is droit usage , since the state still 
remains the de jure owner of the forest resources and retains the rights of forfeiture in case 
the community fails to fulfil their obligations. 
 
 Section 64 (1) states that “forest management shall be the concern of the ministry in 
charge of forests working through public body. It may sub-contract certain management 
activities to private or community bodies”. This new law recognizes “customary rights”, 
even though non-permanent. Section 8(1) states that “logging or customary rights means 
the right which is recognized as being that of the local population to harvest all forest, 
wildlife and fisheries products freely for personal use, except the protected species.” 
 
I observed that there are legal limits to customary user rights. According to one of the 
farmers:, “Certain items such as bush-meat, firewood, honey, palm-wine, eru (gnetum 
africanus) are normally commercialized by us farmers, and these items constitute a source 
of our livelihood. Even though these activities are illegal, the state collects business tax 
(Impot liberatoire) from us, the “buyam sellers”;86 and we are mainly farmers”.  
 
 The reaction of the operations committee staff and some forestry officers (sometimes for 
the purpose of conservation) towards these activities has been frustrating resulting in 
seizure of arms and products. The result has been an atmosphere of bitterness and 
suspicious of the real intentions of the officers or administrators since the confiscated 
products are rarely sold either by public auction as required by the law. 
 
One of the Operations Committee Members (O.C.M.) who is equally a farmer (names 
withheld for security reasons) clearly stated, “The Delegate for Forestry issues permits for 
exploitation of timber. When they (O.C.M.) apprehend illegal timber, the Delegate will call them 
by phone and threaten them. He collaborates with the D.O. and the Commissioner of Police 
easily since they all come from the same region”. 
Another farmer, Mr. Mbah, complained bitterly by stating, “Sometimes our traps are being 
destroyed illegally and our charcoal or timber seized and locked-up. When the case is brought 
to the sub-Divisional Officer, he calls us up for a peaceful settlement or negotiation for the 
release of our goods. After such settlement, our goods disappear in the night” 
 
I observed that there is the absence of a robust traditional regulatory framework to protect 
the rights of some farmer groups. This is because farmers are governed by chiefs installed 
and controlled by the central administrative bodies; very often these local authorities have 
little internal recognition (Biyong et al., 2008). With the transformation of community 
rights to forest and resources, management powers were transferred instead to management 
committees of the councils (BBNRMC), and not to village chiefs (see fig 4). There is need 
for the farmers to fight for their rights through this the council management commitees.  
 
I observed that even though the farmers are the largest user group within their villages as 
indicated by the council (BBNRMC), they are not powerfully represented (numerically and 
democratically) within the Management Council.87 So the farmers are experiencing a 
                                                          
86 Buyam sellers are people who buy goods to re-sell the goods. They are often known as 
“petit traders”. 
87 Constitution of Bimbia Bonadikombo Natural Resource Management Council 
(BBNRMC), 1998. Article 4(b). 
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situation of “elite capture” in management through the council (BBNRMC) which is 
creating bitterness in the minds of farmers with regards to management and exploitation of 
the community forest.  
5.1.5 Collective Choice Arrangements 
Most individuals affected by operational rules (working rules) can participate in modifying 
the operational rules (Ostrom, 1990).88 The Simple Management Plan (SMPBBCF, 2001) 
entitles the farmers to be mostly involved in the establishment of rules within the council, 
especially the customary user rights. According to Article 4 of the constitution of BBCF, 
the Management Board of BBCF shall comprise representation from all stake holders: 
-Honorary: The Paramount Chief and all chiefs within the Community Forest Area. 
-Elites voted by each village within the forest area. 
-Elites of Bimbia community appointed by the Paramount Chief in consultation with other 
chiefs and councillors in the area. 
-Farmers’ Representatives from Southern and Northern Bimbia Bonadikombo. 
-Charcoal Union Representatives voted by charcoal burners 
-Representatives from timber exploiters from Southern and Northern Bimbia 
Bonadikombo. 
The council (BBNRMC) shall elect the board and its executives, make policy, guide and 
direct actions of the board, ensure discipline, lobby and raise funds.89 The constitution of 
the management board shows the level involvement of the community members in the 
community forest management process. It equally shows that farmers are involved in the 
appointment of leadership. 
 
According to Mr Ngale, while describing the participation of farmers collectively, he stated 
that, “We work with groups of farmers, and the farmers have their union90. So the farmers are 
involved in the choice and use of community resources as a group. So farmers express their 
views in decision making through their groups. .” 
 
I observed that the registered farmers in BBCF are not much involved in collective decision 
–making rules and constitutional rules.91There is an absence of a climate of confidence and 
partnership between the farmers and the council (BBNRMC) staffs. This is because the 
farmers, who constitute the largest user group, are not fully involved in evaluation, 
monitoring, of the community forest. 
5.1.6 Monitoring 
With regards to monitoring, the Operations Control Committee (O.C.C.) does the 
“Policing” of timber, fuel-wood, charcoal exploitation and Non- Timber Forest Products 
(NTFP). Mr Ngale stated, “About 35% of farmers assist the Operations Committee in 
identifying and locating boundaries of farms. There are plans to organize patrol on a daily basis 
and equally to divide the farms into zones, to be shared amongst Operations Committee 
Members for efficient monitoring.” 
                                                          
88 Some of the members of the Management Board who can modify operational rules 
equally have farms within the community forest.  
89 Constitution of BBCF, Article 4. 
90 Farmer`s union are small associations of farmers with a common interest e.g to promote 
sustainable agriculture. Farmers union is not an organ of BBNRMC, but the union 
cooperates with the council (BBNRMC) in control and protection of farmers interest. 
91 Collective decision- making rules are rules experienced at intermediate level. They determine how 
rules are defined and they influence emerging regulations used at operational level. Constitutional 
rules determine who can participate in the political system, what powers and authority they exercise 
(Ostrom et al. 2001; Ostrom 1999a).  
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My observations reveal that monitoring within a community forest is incumbent on 
communities, who chose their means and keep the forest administration informed. In case 
of an offence by a community member or an outsider, the matter is reported to the forest 
officer who proceeds to prosecute the offender (Egbe, 2001) 
According to Mr. Philip in “Pidgin English”, “We no sabi who di do weti sometimes? The 
Sub-Divisional Officer, the  Commissioner of police, the Delegate for forestry, Operations 
Committee Members,  all man di run after we (farmers) for catch timber and charcoal. All 
man di find na money”(Meaning the Divisional officer, the Commissioner of police, the 
Delegate for Forestry, Operations Committee Members are all interested in checking illegal 
timber exploitation and charcoal, to enrich themselves). 
 
 During the focus group interview, the farmers complained by stating that, “During 
monitoring, in case of infraction, sometimes our crops are destroyed without proper 
communication.  It pains….. Because we cannot go back into the bush to show where we 
harvested our crops, and we are not involved in the monitoring exercise sometimes”   
The farmers requested the need to build a working relationship with (the OCM), instead of 
destroying their crops or taking them home as “Bush Allowance”. Contending parties in any 
situation should be given equal opportunity to provide evidence to prove their case. 
Therefore collaboration and coordination with between the council and the farmers is a 
priority. 
5.1.7 Graduated Sanctions and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
According to BBCF Bi-Annual Report (2005), between January and June 2005 for 
example, 94 monitoring patrols were carried out, and 29 chainsaws were seized, 721 boards 
of timber seized, 85 logs of fuel wood seized, and 9 charcoal bags seized. This statistics 
makes the researcher to assume that the staff or guards of the council are vigilant in spite of 
the limited resources to carry out monitoring and sanctioning of defaulters. 
 
The state as the guardian of the forest is partly responsible for conflict resolution. The state 
retains exorbitant powers of suspension and annulment of the unilaterally drafted 
management agreement with the village communities. Art 31 stipulates that, the 
administrative department in charge of forestry may at any time suspend the activities of 
the community, when the community fails to comply with the requirements of the Simple 
Management Plan (SMP). During my phone interview with Mr Ngale (the coordinator for 
the farmers), his response was that: 
“Our activities are carried out as stipulated in the Simple Management Plan, but there is 
need for an inventory of the forest resources to be carried out in order to ascertain the level 
of our compliance with the SMP.  This needs approval by the MINFOF, and it is expensive 
to be carried out within the (BBNRMC) council budget.  The procedure and methods to 
evaluate failure or success of our compliance with the requirements of the SMP, is what I 
do not know” 
 
Another farmer contacted on phone was Mr Ngombe who spoke on the sanctioning 
mechanism within their farmers union. He said: 
“Most of our conflicts are treated within the union. We handle minor cases, and quarrels, 
and the major cases are reported to the council (BBNRMC), or the chiefs, or the Sub-
Divisional officer or other relevant authority” 
 
I could not get clear responses on the mechanisms put by the law for conflict resolution or  
methods for evaluating “failure by the council to comply” as stipulated in SMP, whether of 
minor or major importance, whether deliberate or accidental, in cases brought to court? It 
was not also clear, what form of arbitration or appeal exists if agreement between the state 
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and the communities cannot be reached? These questions needed to be clarified to the 
village communities. 
 
I observed that the system of sanctioning in BBCF is mixed. In some cases it is graduated, 
while in others it is un-graduated. 92Breaking of rules is not properly recorded. It was 
difficult for me to access the rate of rule- breaking. But the most effective impact to the 
farmer is the loss of reputation connected with breaking of rules, because this leads to 
humiliation. One of the Operations Committee Members (names withheld) stated: 
93, “The law is not clear on what constitute a minor and a major offence. We do not also know 
why the Delegate for Forestry will issue permits for exploitation of timber without our 
knowledge, and when we apprehend illegal wood, we are instead intimidated? The victims are 
called later by the commissioner of police or Divisional Officer for negotiation and the seized 
wood disappears in the night. This is the real conflict.” 
 
According to Mr. Philip (a member of the union) the common conflicts are over boundaries 
and missing food crops within the farms. He stated: 
“Our sanction depends on the nature of the offence. If it involves illegal charcoal or timber, 
sometimes the matter is taken to the D.O. of Limber III who will either order for the arrest of the 
said person and the products confiscated. Later the parties will come and negotiate. For minor 
offences within the union, we apply fines in the form of cash, crates of beer, of food items”  
5.1.8 Nested Enterprises94 
As required by the 1994 forestry law, a community must constitute a legal entity, to avoid 
rendering implementation of the law redundant (Egbe, 2001).95 Village communities were 
not legal entities before the 1994 forestry law.  This associative model includes restriction 
concerning economic activities and profits. Money generated by community forest can only 
be invested in community forest.96 This has a negative impact on the livelihoods of the 
farmers.  
 
I could not get clear answers regarding this concept of legal entity from Mr. Ngale (the 
coordinator for farmers) , but in  a phone conversation with Mola Ngomba (another farmer) 
on how the  user group approach is implemented  in BBCF, he said: 
“This use of a  group approach (as an entity ) is partly the  reason for the conflict between the 
council (BBNRMC) management and the Municipality, because revenue  generated from the 
community forest activities , is shared amongst the group members in the form of unpaid 
salaries. So the municipality perceives this act as bad governance or a poor benefit sharing 
mechanism for the village communities”  
                                                          
92 In this thesis graduated sanctions means that (the higher the contravention of the rule, the 
the higher is the sanction, and vice versa, and ungraduated sanctions means (the sanction is 
not proportionate to the contravention of the rule).  
93This O.C.M. who is equally a farmer was very bitter regarding what the Delegate for forestry, the 
D.O. for Limbe III and the commissioner are doing with regards to sanctioning of farmers and other 
defaulters for illegal offences committed within the community forest. He didn`t want his name 
mentioned but hoped to tell them his mind someday.  
 
94 Nested institutions are sets of rules that are hierarchically nested at several different 
scales to address problems or challenges confronted at different temporal and special scales. 
www.stockholmresilence.org. 
95 A community forest group or community must form an organization, with a legal entity 
in order for Law 94/01 to be enforceable. Income from the community forest can only be 
used for the purpose of the community forest, and not for other public utilities. 
96 (See Annual budgets , 2008 Annual Report) Oyono et al., 2012. Beyond the Decade of Policy 
and Community Euphoria: The State of Livelihoods under New Local Rights to Forest in Rural 
Cameroon. 
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The BBCF (includes the five villages, Bonadikombo, Bonangombe, Lawanda, Dikolo, and 
Bonbile) is the only community forest with a Management Plan and a Management 
Convention.97 . Therefore in terms of decision-making, respect for rules, the user group 
approach is more relevant and the impact is direct. But in terms of benefit sharing perspective of 
forest resources, the equal representation on a village by village basis might be more acceptable, 
but both approaches can promote good governance if properly implemented (Minang, 2003;  
Oyono, 2012).  
 
5.2 What sort of relationship exist (in terms of power, control, social 
and environmental) between the management council (BBNRMC), 
the registered farmers and other local organizations, and how do the 
local farmers perceive these relationships? 
 
In this section, data is presented in the form of themes. This is done to match the structure 
of the research question. I will first of all examine power relationship, then control, then 
social and environmental relationships of the management council, the registered farmers 
and other local organisations.   
5.2.1 Institutional and stakeholder relationship of Power. 
In this analysis, I explored the different institutions (laws, formal and informal rules, 
behavioural norms and enforcement mechanisms) involved in the management of the 
community forest. The presentation and analysis made use of law No 94/01, the 
Constitution of BBCF, the Simple Management Plan for the BBCF for the period 2002-
2027, interviews and participant observation of the level of participation and involvement 
of stakeholders who have the capacity to influence and share control with other authorities 
over development initiatives and decisions which affect the farmers of this community. 
Issues observed were control, access and management of the Community forest resources. 
The organisations and other actors involved in the management of the community forest 
are: the Ministry of forestry and wildlife, the Bimbia Bonadikombo Natural Resources 
Management Council, the Traditional rulers (chiefs), the Conservation Agencies, the Limbe 
III municipality and the Public. The various Institutions are represented in a Venn diagram 
as shown below. 
This analysis was developed mainly from interviews, participant observation and secondary 
data and validated with key informants.   The researcher equally made certain assumptions 
with regards to the influence of Institutions within this community as at the time of 
conducting the field work. This consideration was due to the geographical, socio-economic 
and political situation and its impact on the people within this community. These 
assumptions were based on the fact that institutions are not static and the world is in 
continuous change. 
Going back to the Venn diagram in Fig 6, for example the Bimbia Bonadikombo Natural 
Resources Management Council has a big circle. This big circle means their policy (rules 
and enforcement mechanisms) has a great influence on decisions that influence the 
livelihood of the farmers of this community. Equally, the diagram is close to the resource 
control (Power). This means, the policies (rules and enforcement mechanisms) of the 
council (BBNRMC), can easily influence the livelihood of the people of the community. 
The BBNRMC is threatened by losing influence and power because of the creation of 
Bimbia municipal council. The BBNRMC is losing power due to decreasing access and use 
of forest resources due to conflict.   
 
                                                          
97 Oyono et al., 2012, p.178. 
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Also the circle of the farmers’ looks smaller, compared to that of the council (BBNRMC). 
This means their policies (rules and enforcement mechanisms) cannot easily influence the 
livelihood of the village community.  After community Based Mapping was done and land 
use allocation, the farmers’ lost unconditional access to forest, for game and NTFP. The 
farmers needed to respect restrictions set by the council (BBNRMC). The farmers need to 
be empowered so that they can have a “Voice” that can compete with the other institutions 
so as to have influence on decisions that influence the livelihood of the people of the 
community. 
 
The Ministry of Forestry and wildlife are in a big circle. They are powerful institutions (in 
terms of constitutional and operational rules and enforcement mechanisms) with much 
power, but are further away from the resource control or power when compared to the 
council (BBNRMC) and the farmers. MINFOF have political power (See table 6). They 
take advantage of the conflict in roles and responsibilities in BBCF.  This means the 
influence of the MINFOF decisions does not affect the farmers’ livelihood very positively. 
This explains the reason why these institutional frameworks are said to be constraints. The 
FOREST RESOURCE CONTROL (POWER) 
NGO’S 
MUNICIPALITY 
MINFOF 
CHIEFS 
BBNRMC 
FARMERS 
Figure 6 Venn diagram showing institutions charged with power. (Land-tenure and resource control) These 
institutions are represented in two ways. Firstly from the size of each circle and secondly from the distance of 
the institution to the problem (Source: Author;2012.) 
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challenge is therefore, for the state to decentralize her power structure on forest 
management.  
 
 
The Mount Cameroon Project 98 a conservation agency is presented in a small circle. It 
possesses power and is further away from the centre of power. This means that their policy 
can influence decisions that influence the livelihood of the people of the community. But in 
terms of strength of their policy, it is smaller than that of farmers, the council, and MINFOF 
to influence livelihood of the poor rural community. 
 
The Municipal Council (Limbe III Council) has a circle larger than that of the NGO’s, but 
they are further away from the centre of the problem. Their policy comparatively, does not 
have a great influence on decisions that can influence the livelihood of the poor rural 
farmers in the community. Due to inappropriate definition of roles and responsibilities, the 
council is gaining some powers from the BBNRMC with regards to access and use of forest 
resources.  
 
The chiefs on the other hand, are represented as powerful institutions, especially 
traditionally, and are closer to the resource or the center of the problem. This means their 
policy have a greater influence on decisions that can influence the livelihood of the local   
farmers in the community.99  There is equally the existence of traditional Institutions (For 
example village councils for decision making and resource management.), in most of the 
villages in the community.100The activities of the village council are functionally linked and 
they influence the effectiveness of the management process (Young, 1999). North  argues 
that informal constraints that are culturally derived will not change immediately in reaction 
to changes in formal rules, leading to tension between altered formal rules and the 
persistent informal constraints (North, 1990).  This is evidence in the long struggle for 
power amongst the members of the management council. This struggle is partly linked to 
the paramount chieftaincy tussle in Limbe Traditional Council, and the need to reclaim part 
of the community forest land from the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC).  These 
institutional arrangements are nested by design within functional and historical broader 
regimes. The paramount chieftaincy tussle is as a result of deliberate clustering of several 
traditional regimes across functional, geographical and historical boarders, and sometimes 
the arrangements of rules and the customary laws overlap largely unintentionally (Young, 
1999).  
 
 
The use of the Venn diagram is mainly because it shows how the registered farmers 
perceive the structure and relationship or interaction of the different institutions within the 
community forest.  According to Pretty et al. (1995), the tool itself reveals causal 
                                                          
98 The Mount Cameroon Project (MCP) is a multilateral biodiversity conservation project 
working directly within MINEF, on Mount Cameroon and surrounding villages. The Goal 
of the MCP is to maintain the biodiversity in the Mt. Cameroon region.www.undp.org. 
99 Chiefs are heads of clan or group. Traditionally, chiefs are auxiliaries of the state. The 
local community names a person they want to become chief based on the candidates bond 
to the community. Traditional chiefs are chosen from families customarily called upon to 
carry out traditional leadership role. Chiefs can equally be appointment by the government 
according to Chieftaincy law Decree No 77/245. Kingmakers can set aside these rules and 
select a candidate they believe can serve the people better. The decree defines family as a 
group of people sharing the same bloodline and lineage from same father. 
100 There is a traditional council with honorary members. The traditional authorities are the 
the paramount chief and other chiefs who are the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the 
BBNRMC. They appoint influential elites or notables to represent them during meetings 
(See BBNRMC constitution). 
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relationship among entities, but it can be used to encourage participants to explore and 
analyse causal links. 
5.2.2 Institutional relationship of control  
This section describes control relationship of the actors.  Generally, rules change from time 
to time, and different land tenure perceptions and rules in this case study, have affected 
actor relationships.  In terms of perception, one of the farmer`s explained: 
 
“Now that we have a municipality with councillors, more strangers101 will want to come 
and live in Bimbia.  So we will have to build houses on our farm land  and demand more 
farms from the council (BBNRMC). As a farmer, I may lose my native farmlands, which 
will mean less food for my family” (Interview respondent).  
 
In Bimbia, it was initially agreed with the representatives of all the actors during the land 
Use Plan and the Simple Management Plan phases,  that each farmer within the forest will 
pay a registration fee of about 25000 FRS (About 50USD). After which his or her farm will 
be assessed and annual rents determined. This was considered too high. Most farmers 
outside BBCF pay about 5000 FRS (10 USD). Less than 200 of the estimated 2000 farmers 
have registered. The farmers think registration is only a pretext and that rents will 
eventually be abolished, there-by kicking them out. They emphasize that, the spirit of pre-
community forest indigenous organizations such as the Victoria Lands and forest 
Conservation and the Victoria Area Rainforest Common Initiative Group that aimed at 
ejecting “non-native settlers” from their forest still prevails.102 Due to this land tenure 
perceptions and issues of trust, there exists poor relationship between the management 
council (BBNRMC) and the registered farmers groups or fuel wood collectors, mainly 
because many users of the forest are non-natives.  
 
 According to results of focus group interview, there has been poor working relationship 
between MINFOF and the municipal council. This could be attributed to lack of clarity in 
roles and responsibilities. When contacted, the Secretary General of the Bimbia 
municipality clearly stated: 
 
 “The   Delegate for forestry does not have the right to issue logging permits within our 
community forest.  It is the council (BBNRMC) that has the power to control the forest 
resource, and the council reports to the municipality. If the BBNRMC cannot address this 
issue, then we as a municipality must step in” (Interview respondent) 
 
 While the Bimbia community accuses MINIFOF of illegally issuing logging permits within 
their forest, and lack of transparency with auction sales from joint seizures, MINFOF 
argues that Bimbia has no right to sanction defaulters. On the other hand, Bimbia 
community insists, the law allows them to deal with minor offences. Therefore the line 
between major and minor is not clear even for the neutral interpreter of policy.  
Such disagreement has created conflicts between the local farmers of the community and 
the forest administrative staff (Minang, 2007).  
 
I observed that the relationship between (MINIFOF) forestry officials and the locally 
registered farmers has not been very cordial. State officials are not well paid sometimes,  
                                                          
101 In this thesis, the term strangers simply means non-natives.  
102 Bimbia Bonadikombo Community Forest Agroforestry Intern Final Report. Prepared by: John 
Antill, CIDA Youth Agroforestry Intern. April 2005. See also interview with Moki, a farmer in 
Bimbia village. 2011. 
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and they face the challenge of working with local farmers and workers of the (Council) 
BBNRMC,  who are mostly volunteer workers who comparatively, lack funds, equipment, 
knowledge, skills (in community forest management).  Building a working relationship has 
been a challenge.103 During the focus group discussion, one of the indigenous farmers 
remarked that: 
“I was a trader, buying and selling fish….when in 2001, the opportunity came to work as 
monitors of the forest in BBNRMC.  It was motivating, and we earned about five dollars 
(2500 FRS) per day. There was money and work, as well as many illegal exploiters around. 
But the situation is no longer the same today.  Payment for patrols is about three dollars 
(1500 FRS) per day, and exploiters complain that timber is scarce; there is frequent 
harassment by officials from MINIFOF”.  
 
On the other hand, the relationship between the village communities and NGOs, especially 
the Mount Cameroon Project, has been very good. NGOs or bilateral projects have 
provided the support communities need for forest management. For example, in Bimbia 
Community, the Mount Cameroon Project (GTZ-DFID funded) has funded and facilitated 
workshops on community forestry regulations. They have equally helped with the 
establishment of a legal entity. The GTZ has equally assisted by providing funds for hired 
expertise to train community members. Funds were also provided for implementation of 
Mapping, forest inventories and the development of a Simple Management Plan. 
5.2. 3 Social and environmental relationship.  
The figure below is a demographic representation of the sampled population in Bimbia 
Bonadikombo village community. 
 
 
 
                                                          
103The Operations Committee workers are volunteers, and they need to be motivated. Focus group 
interview with farmers and personal observation by researcher (2011). 
Characteristics Total Number. 
N=22 % 
Gender Male  19 86.36 
Female 3 13.64 
Age Range. 21-30 3 13.6 
31-40 6 27.3 
40 and above 13 59.1 
Occupation  Farmer/Fisherman  15 68.2 
Farmer/Civil 
servant 
1 4.5 
Farmer/Trader 6 27.3 
Education Primary/Vocation 13 59.1 
secondary 4 18.2 
Above secondary 5 22.7 
Duration in 
Community 
(BBC). 
11-20 yrs. 4 18.2 
20 and above 18 81.8 
Family size. ≤ 3 8 36.4 
≥4 14 63.6 
Figure 7 Demographic information of respondents in Bimbia Bonadikombo Community.(source, 
Author, 2014). 
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Based on findings from the field, it was realised that individual characteristics of the actors 
are liable to influence social and environmental relationship (Ngendakumana et al). A 
demographic study of the sampled population in (Fig. 12) is relevant in explaining these 
relationships. The characteristics show that, more male respondents ((86.36%) than females 
(13.64%), participated in the study. More than 55% of the respondents were above 40 
years, and had lived in the community for more than 20 years. This means they lived in the 
community before the creation of the community forest. Also all the respondents were 
registered farmers within the community and had farms in the community forest. All the 
respondents had a family size (36.4%  had 3 or less than 3 children, and 63.6% had 4 or 
more than 4 children) and were either working with the local government or self-employed. 
In addition all of them had attended at least primary education. These characteristic could 
be evaluated depending on how well the interviewees are informed about the concept of 
community forest and their rights and benefits. These characteristics could be classified into 
four themes. (1) Awareness about the concept of community forest (2) Awareness about the 
management process (3) Awareness about rights (4) Awareness about benefit sharing. 
 
 Out of the 22 farmers selected in the study, all of them knew about the existence of BBCF. 
65% of the farmers had little knowledge of the persons that facilitated the formation of the 
community forest. One of the farmers commented that: 
 
“This community forest came into existence thanks to efforts of the management council 
and some elites like Madame Burnley, but I do not know most of the members of the 
management committee.”104. (Interview respondent). 
 
40% of the farmers could explain that the formation of the community forest was around 
1998, but did not know the facilitation role played by Mount Cameroon Project (MCP) and 
some influential elites of the community. When asked “Who are the persons involved in the 
management of the community forest?” their responses were limited to Mola Ngale 
(Coordinator for the farmers) and the Operations Committee Members (OCMs). But in 
general, the farmers were aware that the community forest was managed by the chiefs, the 
management council, the Limbe III council, and some selected elites of the council. 
However, the farmers knew their group representative and Union leaders but were not 
aware of the persons representing the interest of all the groups, or knowledge of the 
management process. One of the interviewees from the municipality reported, “There is 
often conflict about who is the right person to issue permission for the exploitation of 
resources in the community forest. Sometimes the president of the management council may 
sign permissions for exploitation and the Limber III council will refuse to recognize the 
permissions. Sometimes council permissions are not recognized by the chiefs. This has been 
a main source of management conflict in BBCF”. . 
 
Because the local farmers are less informed about the main persons involved in the 
management, as well as the management process, they are unable to participate 
meaningfully to the implementation process.  I observed that about 40% did not quite 
understand their benefits and rights as users of the forest, within their village communities, 
but felt that they needed to be protected as an entity, to carry out their activities as farmers.  
One of the farmers argued that, “ access to explore  income generating resources  like 
timber, charcoal burning, NTFP, (particularly Prunus Africana ) is not  by merit, but  base 
on “Man- know-man ”105 Meaning the process is   characterised with a lot of  favouritism, 
nepotism, tribalism , and only those who could pay or had connections, or were in high 
administrative positions  were given access to  resource exploitation”. 
 
                                                          
104 Madame Burnley is the current Board Chairman of BBNRMC. 
105“Man- know –man “in this context means friendship or close relationship with one 
another.  
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In terms of local knowledge, all the farmers who participated during the focus group 
discussion and those interviewed testified that they were aware of certain principles applied 
in the governance of the community forest.  Mr Philip (a farmer at Chop farm) stated that: 
“I have heard about the law, but I do not have good knowledge or a copy of the law. But 
our group had been sensitized and educated about some of the rules contained in the law, 
for example the need to respect clearly defined boundaries, which we do apply   as a guide 
in our activities.   This was done by the management committee members during our village 
meetings, and during our farmers’ union meetings.”(Focus group interview) 
 
 
 
 With regards to farmers’ rights, one of the farmer group leaders remarked that:   
“Local people like us cannot fight for our rights and benefits of the community forest 
because we do not even understand what the law says about it”. 70% of the interviewees 
noted that most often their groups were not invited for meetings, or training programs. One 
of the farmers was eager to know why this happens very often. He said, “Are we excluded 
from many meetings or group activities because we cannot speak and write good English?” 
  
With regards to benefit sharing from the forest resources, another farmer responded that, 
“Yes I benefit when tourist and researchers visit us and they buy our foodstuffs. Some of 
our children serve as porters and field assistants. We equally get our medicinal plants and 
timber to construct our canoes from the forest” 
 
I observed that the farmers had different views about benefit sharing mechanism of the 
council (BBNRMC). This was partly because the law requires that benefits in the form of 
revenue should be used for only community forest projects.  Review of Annual Reports for 
2008; show that revenue is distributed in the form of unpaid salaries, since the staffs are 
working as volunteers.  One of the farmers, who had a contrary opinion to the practices of 
the staffs of the council (BBNRMC) regarding benefit sharing, suggested by saying that: 
“I think it will be better if funds from sale of timber are used by the management council to 
build schools or clinic, or improve water supply in the villages, or provide loans to improve 
farming practices in the villages. This will improve our lifestyle and relationship with one 
another”106 
During the focus group discussion, I observed that those who had a positive perception 
about the implementation process of the law and benefits were mostly the natives 
(Bakweries), who actually had direct benefits, or a member of their household.107 Such 
direct benefit included employment in the council (BBNRMC) or involved in some rural 
development project around the municipality. 
 
The other objective of this study is to describe the role and strategies of the management 
council (BBNRMC) and other stakeholders in improving institutional performance. The 
table below is a description of the responsibilities and strategies of community forest actors.  
 
 
                                                          
106 Nuesiri, E., (2014) argues that income generated from community forest is  used to pay 
workers and cover operations cost. The institution has not been able to fund collective 
social development projects. 
107 The term natives in this thesis refers to indigenes of the Bimbia- Bonadikombo 
community (the Bakeries or Isubus)  a vocal minority group in Cameroon (Konings and 
Nyamnjoh, 2003). 
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Description of the responsibilities and strategies of community forest actors.  
 
Figure 8 Summary Description of BBCF Actors and their strategies (Source: Author, 2014) 
 
Actor Role/Responsibility Interest Resources Remarks 
BBNRMC Represent the community and coordinate CF 
activities. Has an elected board, a management 
council. 
Implement the SMP. Has forest 
management in charge of day-to-day 
operations. 
Office, Allowances, Training, revenue 
from sale of forest products and 
permits, fees etc. 
Implements BBCFMP on all 9 
compartments. 
Chiefs Custodian of tradition. Village heads.Authorise 
access to all resources. Monitor. 
Establish and reinforce claims to 
traditional lands. Members of BBNRMC 
board. 
Fees, gifts and limited political power. 
 
Farmers. Register with BBNRMC. Access to land for increased food 
production. 
Income from crop sales. Want implementation of Farmer 
Education Program 
Timber exploiters. Exploitation of the CF. Access to tree resources. Direct income from activity. Difficult to identify them, because 
the come from out of the CF. 
Charcoal Burners Take part in CF activities Access to tree resources Income from activity. 
 
Fuel wood collectors Take part in CF development activities. Access to tree resources Income from activity. 
 
MINEF Supervise forest management. Provide technical 
support to CF.  
Support SFM. Collect forest revenue. Political power. Technical knowledge 
on forestry. Sales revenue. 
Staff and material shortages. 
Municipality. Democratic local governance. Support CF 
development. 
Local government development. Land 
use plan. 
Financial and workshop facilities. 
Meeting facilities. 
 
Local Administration. 
(Sub-Divisional 
Officer). 
Ensure peaceful resolution of conflict. Local 
governance. 
Peace. Rural development. Political power. 
 
Mount Cameroon 
Project (MCP). 
Facilitate CF planning and management. Development of models for participatory 
biodiversity conservation. 
Finance, technical knowledge in 
forestry. Lobby strength. Facilitating 
skills. 
Want Bio-diversity conservation. 
Fisher men Participate in CF development Users rights Fishing nets, small canoe. 
 
Elites[1] Promote CF development. Lobby and mobilize 
support. 
Establish and reinforce claims to 
traditional lands. 
Political power and financial 
resources. 
 
Women Interest is access rights and farm land. 
   
MINFOF (Ministry of 
Forest and Fauna. 
Ensure sustainable forest management Conflict resolution. Provide technical 
support. 
Political power. 
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6 Analyses and Discussion.  
In this section, the patterns of interaction in the course of the implementation process of law 
94/01, are presented and analysed.  The focus of the analysis of the variables is viewed at 
the operational level of decision making. These variables include: Unintended discrepancies 
in the institutional design of the 1994 law, Group representation in the management 
process, Discrepancies in the management regimes, Access to resources and users rights, 
Community empowerment, Use of user- group approach in management, Dominance of the 
policy process by powerful actors, Emergence of new collaboration amongst civil society 
and the management, Redefinition of forest governance and Benefit sharing mechanism etc. 
The outcomes of the interactions are evaluated as perceived by the farmers, and 
recommendations made.     
 
The context of the Cameroon forest Act and its implementation as envisaged in policy 
documents, exhibit interplay of several governance regimes. The analysis reveal that,   for 
the government of Cameroon to have adopted community forestry as part of its 
decentralization forestry policy of 1994, simply means the ministry in charge of forest sub-
contracts certain management activities to communities for a period (MINEF, 1998a; Egbe, 
2001)108Within BBCF, the management process exhibits interplay  of state forest regimes, 
council forest regime and private forest regime. These regimes have distinct governance 
mechanisms with respect to forest management responsibilities and benefit distribution.  
Even among different community-based forest management regimes, the degree of 
community autonomy and level of benefit to community varies. For instance, in BBCF, the 
local authorities are expected to enjoy full autonomy of management and use of forest 
products (except protected species or areas), and all the income from the community forest 
is invested in the community forest or shared to beneficiaries. On the contrary, several 
government and council decisions have been taken which curtail community rights to forest 
resource use in BBC.   Furthermore, under collaborative forest management system as is 
the case between the state and the traditional authority system  in BBC, communities are 
expected to have limited rights over the management and use of forest products and only a 
portion of income remains at local level and the balance goes to government. Such 
discrepancies and their unintended consequences have not been widely discussed and 
analysed while devising the institutional design of the 1994 forestry law.  
 
Also in spite of horizontal interplay of these regimes in BBCF, there is evidence of 
inadequacy in the formal and informal rules in use, in the institutional design of BBC.  
Topa et al. (2009, p.36) note that “management of the Bimbia –Bonadikombo community 
forest occurs in a complex setting….the margin of urban development…and it is feared that 
the model is not sustainable” without external support. One of the challenges for 
management within this setting will be how to identify the right strategies for combating 
the drivers of deforestation that fit with the existing mixture of - management regime in 
BBCF. There are many options for deciding among management regimes based on their 
effectiveness in enhancing forest conditions. There is equally contestation among actors 
supporting different management regimes. For example, community forestry has been 
highly contested on the grounds that, failure to properly define the “nature of a 
community”, has excluded some non-indigenes  residing close to the community forest from 
participating in the management process, even though it has been recognized as an effective 
mechanism for restoration of degraded forest in Bimbia- Bonadikombo community. 
Community policy experts argue that any regime selected should vigorously promote the 
potential non-monetary benefits, like formal recognition of community land clams offered 
                                                          
108 Decentralized forestry policy involves the transfer of subsidiary powers over forest 
management from central government to lower level institutions in society, including local 
government and community-based organizations (Ribot, 2002). 
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local communities alongside its monetary benefits (Nuesiri, 2014). Conversely supporters 
of community forestry have criticised collaborative forest management in the past as they 
see it as an excuse for not handing over more forest to local communities.  
 
As regards group representation, a good number of the farmers acknowledge positively the 
inclusion of all stakeholder groups in the management process within the council 
(BBNRMC), as a means of reducing conflict. (See constitution of BBNRMC and focus 
group discussion). The ability of the council (BBNRMC) to promote its intended goal 
(Improving communication and participation amongst different ethnic groups) through this 
action is an aspect of institutional effectiveness (Young, 1999).  Before the creation of 
BBNRMC, the indigenes had three elite institutions namely the Limbe Traditional Council, 
the Victoria Land and Forest Conservation Committee (VLFCC9, and the Victoria Area 
Rainforest Common Initiative Group (VARCIG) with the primary aim of establishing 
control over land. (Oji and Tekwe, 1998; Minang, 2003). Meanwhile the non-indigenous 
forest users had no such structures and their incentive for forest use was livelihood survival. 
So Mount Cameroon Project (MCP) Limbe assisted them to create farmer- groups, charcoal 
producers, timber exploiters, “fuelwood sellers” users groups (Tekwe and Percy, 2001). 
Initially, the indigenes strongly opposed the inclusion of non-indigenes in the Bimbia –
Bonadikombo (BB) management board (Brown, 1999; Tekwe and Percy, 2001), but a 
consensus was reached and the BB management board was created with a composition of 
about 75% indigenes and just 25% non-indigenes. So, this action actually put a stop to the 
consistent marginalisation of voices of the non-indigenes within the local communities, 
while powerful actors particularly the state and donor organisations still prevailed.   
 
 
With regards to access to resources and users rights, they vary across different management 
regimes. Legally, the government of Cameroon retains the ownership of the land in all 
types of regime, except for private forest. Though community –based regimes are endowed 
with certain rights to manage and use forest resources, such rights are severely restricted in 
government controlled forest including protected areas. One of the threats of the Bimbia- 
Bonadikombo (BB) management is a perpetual lack of secure tenure over land that their 
forest stands on. The BB community has clear rights to trees and forest products (except 
protected species), but not to the land itself. This situation where the rights of owners 
remain ambiguous can be problematic in any agreement involving parties, for example in 
the  context of carbon-trading, since carbon is contained not only in trees, but also in the 
soil, roots and organic debris (Khatri D.B, 2012).  
 
There are indicatives also of potential hindrances for an effective implementation of the 
management process. 109 Several government decisions and directives towards curtailing 
community rights also provide evidence for this. I believe that to transform the forest from 
degraded to a sustainable forest; the existing institutional framework ought to be altered to 
some margin. I argue that based on the Simple Management Plan for BBCF, the council 
(BBNRMC) has bargaining strength (See composition of BBNRMC in constitution) and can 
perceive that they can do better by altering the existing institutional framework by some 
margin.110 But their perception should depend on the information that the state receives 
and how the Ministry of forestry and wildlife, process that information.111 (North, 1990). 
The creation of Limbe III council in 2007 is an outcome of the need for institutional 
                                                          
109 Technical assistance (S (37)1.), offered by MINIFOF ought to be free. Use BBNRMC nursery 
seedlings of NTFP for re-forestation and as a source to generate revenue. See EMP for BBCF, 2005. 
110 Before reforms, the state preserved all rights. New legal status of rights to forest and resources 
relates to the allocation to village communities of management rights and market rights to forest 
located in the Non-permanent community forest. http://www.conservationandsociety.org, p.174. 
111 Government faces difficulty to regulate the use of resource if she lacks enough and correct 
information. 
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change, and both Limbe III council and BBNRMC must adopt a citizen oriented type of 
cooperation in order to respond to the challenge of value-pluralism in decision making 
process. Also cooperation and commitment has to go beyond information and power 
sharing. 112 
 
I also observed that efforts are being made by the management council to transform 
registered farmers from less productive farmers to more productive farmers.113 To achieve 
this, the Farmer Education Program (FEP) was adopted by the council and the technical 
services of (MINFOR) forestry department.   A review of the 2008 Annual Report showed 
that several meetings had been held to sensitize farmer groups and assist them in their 
activities. For example Good Friends Livestock farmers` group was assisted in the 
construction of their nursery. 20 farmers attended a workshop on Project writing organized 
by the council in collaboration with Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
Interns, to give them skills in writing proposals for funding farming related work. But based 
on my focus group discussion with the farmers, not all farmer groups registered within the 
council (BBNRMC) are being contacted during meetings or training workshops organised 
by the council. I took note of the fact that the procedure to notify them or register most of 
the farmer groups for such meetings is not clear. The effect has been a high level of 
ignorance and illiteracy amongst the farmers. North asserts in his 1973 book “The rise of 
the western world. A New Economic History” that “Efficient economic organization is the 
key to growth” Inefficient economic organization is partly the reason for the inability of the 
council to transform registered farmers to be more productive. For formal rules, informal 
norms and enforcement mechanism to work in a particular community, that community or 
council must understand the local context.114.  Inspite of this challenge, there is still 
evidence of 115empowerment of the farmers, which could be seen through the decision by 
the management council to initiate land reclamation process from the state plantation 
company (CDC).  This act can be considered as a direct result of community 
empowerment. 
 
 
With regards to the approach taken towards participation, the council (BBNRMC) applies a 
forest user group approach in which all stakeholder groups are considered as entities 
alongside chiefs, and constituted institutions like MINEF, MINFOF, MCP, the municipality 
and others. Even though these users come from different villages, they are not considered to 
represent   villages. These users are seen as villages only in the case of representation in 
BBNRMC Operations Committee. 116This has been adopted for all meetings (Minang, 
2003, Oyono, 2005). This conscious effort by groups of actors in whatever form (for 
                                                          
112 For example, the  Mayor of limbe III warns against the cutting down of trees to construct 
houses as an excuse that will not be tolerated, because of unauthorized and unsustainable 
exploitation of BBCF, and the fact that the forest is under state protection (Roland, M.; 
2015)  
113 By promoting public participation through Eco-tourism, Agro-forestry, and Beekeeping. Eco-
tourism is “Respectful travel to natural areas that conserve the environment and improve the 
wellbeing of local people”-The International Eco-tourism Society, 1990. See Ecotourism Marketing 
Plan for BBCF. Prepared by CIDA/Camosun College International Ecotourism Intern, Craig Paulson. 
April 2005. 
114 Most farmers do not own their farmlands and this affects their motivation to work on their farms, 
and they detest the nature and concept of privatization of their lands (Focus group interview with 
farmers, 2011). 
115 Rules are adaptable over time. In the 18th century, Bimbia was a Slave Trade Port, but this Slave 
Trade Port today is of cultural, historical, and touristic importance to Cameroon and the farmers in 
particular. So the management process is adaptable to this positive change. .  
116 I know this through complains from non-indigenous forest users who complain of not 
having a voice before and after the creation of the community forest. In their own words, 
“We go to the board meeting only to hear what the bakweri authorities will say” (Personal 
communication, 2012) 
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example, considering stakeholder groups as nested enterprises or entities) to address and 
improve institutional interaction and its effects is an aspect of interplay management117 
(stokke, 2001; Oberthur, 2009). Minang (2003) also argues that the user group approach is 
more relevant for its impact is direct.  Bimbia-Bonadikombo community possesses some 
characteristics that favour “Collective Choice Principles,”118 such as well-designed 
boundaries for resources and to a lesser extent,   for members of the community as well.  
Hence they have some relevant experience when it comes to staying as a group 
 
There is equally the dominance of the policy-making process by powerful actors. The 
forestry bureaucracy and the associated policy-making process in Cameroon are dominated 
by entrenched interest, with a strong influence on policy outcomes. This domination 
materialises through the involvement of a few powerful actors, namely the BBNRMC, the 
Limbe III municipality, the Limbe traditional council, the ministries  in charge of forest 
represented by (MINEF) and (MINIFOR), the government (represented by Sub-.Divisional 
Officers), donor organisations and powerful elites.  While some elite members such as Mrs 
Burnley have played an active role in the policy dialogues and processes, they reflect the 
interest and voices of only a couple of stakeholders groups (e.g, indigenous groups), 
whereas, the participation of more marginalized groups such as women and youths have 
been very limited.  
 
The implementation process has brought about new collaboration among civil society and 
institutions, though the longevity and effectiveness of these collaborations remains to be 
seen. . This is evident in changing standards and functions of the limbe III municipality as 
they respond to the spread of farms and illegal and unsustainable exploitation of the forest.  
In the process of decision making by the BBNRMC, some actors lost their resource access 
rights or power to control, while others gained power, influencing a change in the power 
structure of forest resource governance. So, new democratic structures emerged, charged 
with responsibility for the management of the community forest.  These structures gave 
some disadvantage groups, such as women a chance. The Limbe III municipality is one of 
these structures and some of the women are councillors who take decisions regarding the 
management of the community forest.  I observed that women participate more in village 
meetings than during forest activities. Records of Bimbia Bonadikombo Community show 
that women constitute more than half of the users of the forest (RCDC, 2002; Minang, 
2003). Yet from the list of participants at key meetings, less than a quarter was women. 
This is disadvantageous for conflict management in the future, should they violate agreed 
management rules made in their absence or without a legitimate group representation 
(Minang, 2003).  
 
The interactions redefine forest governance in Bimbia –Bonadikombo community (BBC). 
Vertical interplay between the law 94/01 and the traditional authority system, as well as 
horizontal interplay amongst existing rules of forest governance and interactions amongst 
actors has redesigned the institutional structure in BBC.  The recent efforts by the 
government to reassert control over the BBCF through legal and policy mechanisms (For 
example, earmarking the forest to be under “state protection”) suggest a recentralization of 
forest governance. As a result of centralisation of powers, the approach to community forest 
management at constitutional level is top-down, and not bottom-up as perceived by some 
farmers and stakeholders.   
                                                          
117 Institutional interplay may occur even without the knowledge of the actors concerned; 
interplay management requires awareness of reflection on the interaction. The user groups 
improve institutional interaction and its effects (Young, 1999).  
118 In this paper collective choice principle are principles accepted together as a group with 
the aim of enhancing the status of the group or attaining the common objective of the 
group. 
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It was difficult to get clear answers from the respondents and more especially the registered 
farmers on how benefits from the forest resources in BBCF were shared. The reason was 
partly due to ignorance and also due to the fact that different interest groups had different 
motives (financial and non-financial) for farming in the community forest. While the 
indigenous interest is land and livelihood, the interest of the non-indigenes in the 
community forest is their livelihood. A  review of the 2005 and 2008 Annual Reports show 
that revenue from community forest activities were used for community projects, mainly 
payment of unpaid salaries to workers and to cover operational cost. There has been no 
evidence of the BBNRMC, funding collective social development projects. This study and 
other studies by Vabi, Njankoua, and Muluh (2002) have found out that indigenous elites 
view control over land as the key expected benefit from community forest. Therefore in 
communities like BB where elites support community forest as part of a trade –off for 
control over land, community forestry advocates should use this trade-off option to devise a 
land ownership process that would secure long-term commitment of local people to 
community forestry for livelihoods (Nuesiri, 2014).  
 
In terms of competence, the interaction between the formal and informal rules in 
management process   provides a platform for meetings, and this builds relationship and 
institutions. The composition of (BBNRMC) board shows that communication structure 
and actor relationships change through the process (See figure 8) . In addition the 
management process makes use of some customary practices in farm allocation, such as the 
payment of “Chu-ku-chu-ku”, and the tenure practice protects the rights of registered 
farmers of the council (BBNRMC).  
 
 
While using the “rule approach” in defining institutions. I explored in this thesis the fact 
that implementing law 94/01 without a clear consideration of the consequences of the 
interaction with historical processes, experiences, and the practices of the village 
communities (mostly local farmers and fishermen), may not reflect outcome of the law 
according to the registered farmers of the council (BBNRMC).119 I regarded informal 
norms not only as norms of behaviour, but equally as rules which have different 
enforcement characteristics with formal rules. In BBCF, formal rules are enforced by the 
courts and other forces of law and order such as the police, while informal norms are 
enforced usually by peers or other customary groups who will impose cost on the individual 
if you do not live up to them. However, the terms “formal” and “informal” institutions have 
been used misleadingly and in different ways. Some scholars see formal laws to mean legal, 
written, explicit, codified (North, 2002).  The idea that there is a dividing line between 
institutions that are entirely “formal” on one hand and entirely “informal” on the other is 
false, because “formal” institutions (in the case of BBCF) always depend on non-legal rules 
and inexplicit norms in order to operate.  I argue that institutions that are adopted by 
farmers, within Bimbia Bonadikombo Communities (BBC), should not be only those 
codified in writing (formal ones). Some customary laws and traditions of the local farmers 
too should be adopted. .  
 
 I identified two major problem areas which encourage unsustainable Community Forest 
Management and need immediate attention in BBCF: A weak institutional and legal 
framework adopted by the BBNRMC and the newly created Limbe municipality, in 
                                                          
119 North (2002) differentiated rules from players. He considers organization as players. 
Organizations “are made up of groups of individuals bound together by some common 
purpose to achieve certain objectives” North (1994, 361). He argues that it`s the interaction 
between institutions and organizations that shapes the institutional evolution of the 
economy.  
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combination with weak interplay management skills120, and mis-directed political, 
historical, ecological and economic incentives. I observed that due to differences in 
objectives of both councils, there are some conflicting roles and responsibilities which 
constrain the enforcement of decisions that affect farmers. I realised the need for the Limbe 
III council and BBNRMC to review the institutional and legal framework adopted from law 
94/01, then prepare a working document that consolidates the objective of the BBNRMC 
(which is, the protection of bio-diversity and sustainable management of forest resources on 
behalf of the village communities), and that of the Limbe III council (which is principally 
to ensure democratic local governance within the village communities.in Bimbia).  
 
Another challenge is the fact that law 94/01 permits community forest management only on 
Non-Permanent Forest Estate? According to the land- Use Plan, a Non-Permanent Forest 
may be converted into Non-forest land at any time. This uncertainty in the status of the 
forest may likely be the case in BBCF. This seems to be a political linkage that creates an 
unsustainable existence of functional linkages (Young et al. 1999). The state remains the 
exclusive owner of land,121with powers to revoke the communities Usufruct right at any 
moment? The state actors may have decided to link these institutions for reasons of 
managerial efficiency that are not linked in functional terms in the long-run (Young et al. 
1999: 64-65). I equally observed that the council (BBNRMC) is facing the challenge of 
implementing the agro-forestry program it has designed on a non-permanent land. As an 
option, law 94/01, section (30) provides for the creation of a council forest as a permanent 
forest which can then reflect the country`s ecological diversity. This will depend on the 
political will of the municipality, administrators, as well as the local farmers in BBCF. 
Brown (2002), calls on government to be committed to sustainable forest management 
(SFM). He argues that “Political will” is not a static concept and therefore can be changed 
overtime.122 
 
With these clustering of several regimes, I  proposes the Northean View which tries to 
eliminate those institutional constraints in the forestry sector which define a set of pay offs 
to political, economic conditions that do not encourage productive activity. For example, in 
the case of BBCF, the execution of forestry policy, arbitrary decision making, at 
operational level is being constrained by some Ministry of Forest and Fauna (MINFOF) 
officials. The solution will be the “establishment of Institutional arrangements that will 
create incentives to channel individual economic efforts into activities that will bring 
private rate of return close to social rate of return”. 123That is to say, direct economic 
pressure can be used by Government Agencies, International Donor Communities, or 
Pressure Groups to change the views of decision makers. In Bimbia for example, there are 
plans to restore the 18th century Slave Trade Port as well as protect the Core-area of the 
community forest. The ports as well as the core-area have great cultural, historical and 
touristic and ecological importance to community. 124  Also the activities of the relevant 
                                                          
120 Institutional interplay may occur even without the knowledge of the actors concerned, 
but inter play management requires awareness of and reflection on the interaction.  
121 Land Tenure Act of 1974 abolished customary land tenure and nationalized all land. Local people 
are only granted User rights to meet their domestic needs e.g. firewood, and these rights can be 
overruled by the state at any time. 
122 David Brown, Director of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London; Email: 
d.brown@odi.org.UK 
123 Rate of return is the gain or loss on investment over specific period of time, expressed as 
a percentage increase over the initial investment cost. In BBCF, Private rate of return refers 
to cost and benefit that flow to farmers and their families based on use of community forest. 
Social rate of return refers to cost and benefit borne by the rest of the community. 
Institutional arrangements should focus more on assisting the local community, rather than 
individual farmers or their families. 
 
124http://bamendaonline.net.  
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ministries (Ministry of Territorial Administration and Ministry of Forestry and Fauna) 
responsible for forest management should be re-examined to ensure that conflicting 
responsibilities are streamlined in order to eradicate the current overlap.  
 
I observed that the farmers need a “voice or a more democratic institution or organization 
that can represent their collective interest as farmers (Both natives and Non-natives).125 
The BBNRMC, as well as the Limbe III Municipality is now faced with the challenge of 
adopting a citizen126 type of cooperation especially with farmers, in order to attain 
integration of values and decisions as demanded by law 94/01.  Both councils (BBNRMC 
and the Bimbia municipality) may need to respond to value pluralism in decision making 
process. As democratic local community forest institutions, cooperation and commitment 
has to go beyond information sharing and power sharing, to a more pluralistic approach 
(North, 2008) 
 
Before the Cameroon nation-state came into being tribal and/or ethno-cultural, entities or 
groups existed as nationalities with territorial limits.127 There is a belief amongst some 
farmers and elites that a bottom- up approach (management system) will instigate the 
Bakweri people (farmers) in their claim of landed patrimony, against the state of Cameroon.  
 The question to ask is: 
“Are the farmers` value and power fully integrated within the management process, and if 
so, are the farmers benefiting from the process?” These questions could be answered in the 
positive or negative. The feeling I had based on participant observation is that the registered 
farmers of the council (BBNRMC) need a “voice” to air out their grievances. Their 
participation and interaction within the BBCF is seen as an “opportunity” and not a “right”. 
  
But it is important to understand the fact that Forestry Policy throughout the developing 
world originates from European “scientific” traditions exported during the colonial period 
(Anne and Larson, 2006). These policies were implemented by foreign and local elite 
whose interest was to maximize and extract profit. In spite of reforms since the end of 
colonial period, policies on the environment usually remain biased against rural 
communities. Even when more recent policies are fair, the rural poor (mainly farmers), face 
severe biases in implementation. Forest based communities still live in disabling 
environment of policy and practice that overrides some positive effects of increased 
“participation” and ownership. Forestry and broader regulatory policies, continue to favour 
urban-based and local elite access to forest resources or resource benefit at the expense of 
the smallholders (farmers) and the poor (Ribot 1998). This policy backed marginalization 
of rural population is deepened even by so called “neutral” or seemingly “fair” policies 
because of unequal access to capital, labour, and credit rooted in class, identity and social 
relations (Ribot and Peluso, 2003, Larson et al 2006a) 
 
In this case study, therefore I argue that, the factors mentioned above have slanted the 
access playing field, filtering farmer (community) competition with more powerful actors. 
                                                          
125 This Opinion is arguable because the Limbe III council created in 2007 by presidential 
Decree No115, has 25 councilors, 5 senior councilors at the Limbe city who are 
democratically elected that can represent the collective interest of the farmers. Law 94/01 
contradicts with customary law with regards to User Rights. It is believed the new 
councilors can  resolve this tension. Also BBNRMC has a management council comprising 
a board, elected representatives of operations Committee, as well as other executives to take 
care of the collective interest of farmers. www.limbe3council.org. 
126 As citizens in Community Forest management (CFM), different actors should consider 
themselves as agents of transformation for the common benefit of society, as opposed to 
stakeholders with different stakes for individual or group benefit. 
127 BLCC against the State/Government of Cameroon. Letter No 1178/MINAGRI/CAB/IG.3 (2003-
12-23). From the Minister of state in charge of Agriculture, to the Minister of state in charge of 
External Relations. http://www.blccarchives.org. 
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Forestry authorities use many exclusionary strategies in their management process even at 
operational level. For example, in the case study, the composition of the board or the 
management council in terms of representatives has not taken into consideration the fact 
that the largest user groups in BBCF are farmers. Therefore farmers’ representatives from 
southern and northern Bimbia Bonadikombo according to the responses of the registered 
farmers and other stake holders, needs to be given extra-attention. 
 
I rap up by arguing that in this case study, the success of the implementation process of  law  
94/01, at the management phase, at operational level,  does not only depend on the  
performance of the  rules , but also on their  interactions  with other arrangements that have 
overlapping jurisdiction. The interactions have reinforced the effectiveness of traditional 
institutions and relationships, as well as the behaviours and outcomes that other institutions 
(formal and informal) do not normally target. On the other hand, the interactions have 
disrupted agreed objectives in certain circumstances, and even off- setted    gains in 
cooperation in other situations. In all the cases, coordination is necessary to consolidate 
rules and reduce conflict, or exploit synergies in implementation.  
 62 
7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this thesis explored the impact of a new forest law on the traditional 
authority system that previously regulated the forest use and forest management in 
Cameroon.  The thesis combined the concepts of “Institutional interplay”, “Cross scale 
institutional linkages “and “Ostrom`s 2005, Institutional design”, in line with the IAD 
framework, to analyse and evaluate the forest management at the operational level, and the 
interactions with various stakeholder within the Bimbia Bonadikombo community. .    
 
The analysis reveal that community based forest management (CBFM) in Cameroon is 
highly influenced by the adequacy of formal and informal processes, powerful domestic 
actors, particularly amongst government, community groups or civil society as well as 
donor organisations. Such influences have posed some challenges to the institutional design 
process of CBFM.  The implementation process of law 94/01 takes precedence over 
customary tenure, which justifies the conflict between natives and non-natives farmers in 
BBCF, and why a user group approach in management is adopted at the operational level 
for the farmers.   
 
Furthermore, the implementation process of law 94/01 suggests risks of recentralizing the 
current decentralized model of forest governance. There has been consistent 
marginalization of the voices of local farmer groups and other users (both indigenes and 
non- indigenes, especially women and youths), while powerful actors, particularly the 
government, the Limbe III Municipality, and donor organisations prevail. Several 
government and council decisions and directives towards curtailing community rights over 
forest resources also provide evidence for this.  
 
In addition, the formal and informal rules do not exist in isolation, but frequently over lap 
and influence each other in their operation.  The thesis suggest the  need for the legislative 
body and administrators to provide the right kind of network, social security, norms needed 
by registered farmers, and then improve the interplay management process at the 
operational level. This will improve relationships and outcomes.  To say that the interaction 
is very supportive of Community Based Forest Management practice, is simplistic and 
misses the point. The participatory forest management system in Bimbia Bonadikombo 
could be described as a “Contractual Partnership” between the state and the village 
communities. So in communities like Bimbia Bonadikombo, farmers prefer to deal with 
institutions that have existed and are successful in supporting community forest initiatives 
and control over land by local communities as part of a trade off in their interactions.   
 
A policy implication of this study is how the inhabitants of Bimbia Bonadikombo (mostly 
farmers and fishermen) take the challenge of institutional design for agro-forestry in the 
future? The study suggest that any institutional design should appreciate the history and 
culture of the indigenous bakweri (Isubu) village communities, the external or indirect 
impact that   the slave trade institution may have had on a wide range of behaviours and 
outcomes, then redesign rules and norms that improve governance of agro-forestry 
development in Cameroon, especially interactions of land policy and tenure reforms. 
 
The study also suggests the need to review the adequacy of formal and informal rules in 
order to prevent ambiguities in terms of ownership of forest resources and land.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Semi- structured questions (Interview guide used in both 
Interviews,  and Focus Group Discussions for both registered 
and non-registered farmers (Natives and non-natives) 
Awareness, attitude and perception. Of the farmers towards the forestry legislation, logging 
within the community forest, and protected area. 
Are you aware about the existence of the new forest legislation? Yes…….No…… 
If yes, how were you informed? 
1)Village meeting 2) council (BBNRMC) officials 
3) MINFOF officials 4) Others. 
If yes, how do you perceive it? 
1) 
Very good 
2) 
Good 
3) 
Bad 
4) Very bad. 
If bad or very bad, why is it so? 
Corruption Restricted 
user rights 
Limited access 
to forest 
resources 
Unclear 
boundaries? 
Not involved 
in the 
design? 
Takes 
precedence 
over 
customary 
laws? 
Other
s 
Are you aware about the existence of a protected area around the community forest? Yes 
…No…… 
If yes, how do you perceive it? 
1)Very Good 2) Good 3)Bad 4) Very Bad 
If bad why is it so? 
 It limits access to 
resources. 
2)Restricted user rights 
within the core 
3) Do not benefit from 
conservation 
4) Others (specify). 
Are you aware about any local development projects carried out by the council (BBNRMC) 
in your community? Yes….No……. 
If yes, how do you perceive it? 
Very good Good Bad Very Bad? 
Why is it good or bad? 
We are not involved  No benefit No cooperation No education /sensitization about the 
project. 
Others (specify). 
 
Do you get any benefit from the forest as a result of the forestry legislation? 
Yes…….No……If yes what are the these benefits? if more than one, then rank them. 
employment Income 
from state 
User rights Revenue 
from forest. 
Access to 
forest 
resources 
Others 
(Specify). 
 
How do you perceive the forest legislation in terms of benefit sharing of forest resources? 
Very good Good Bad Very bad Depends on 
implementation. 
If bad, why is it so? 
Corruption Embezzlement Tribalism Others 
 
Do you get benefits from the protected area around your community? Yes….No….If yes, 
what are the benefits? 
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Employmen
t 
Recreatio
n 
Incom
e from 
tourist 
Conservatio
n 
Access 
to 
resource
s 
Rural 
developmen
t 
Other
s 
 
How do you perceive benefit received from the protected area? 
Very good Good Bad Very bad 
 
If bad, why is it so?  
Interview guide with forest manager and forest extension workers.  
7.1.1.1 What duties do you carry out in this community area? And for how long have you 
worked in this area? 
7.1.1.2 In the area, how was the management of the community forest before the 
implementation of law 94/01. 
7.1.1.3 Did you know anything about the law before it was implemented? 
7.1.1.4 How does the law interact with your functions? 
7.1.1.5 What are your general thoughts about the implementation process of the law? 
7.1.1.6 Are there strengths or weaknesses with regards to the implementation process? 
7.1.1.7 Do you perceive the implementation process at the operational level very sustainable 
or reliable? 
7.1.1.8 What have you learnt about the implementation process in the Bimbia Bonadikombo 
community forest? 
 
 Assessment of outcome of the management process at the 
operational level. 
PARTICIPATION 
1) Are farmers involved in the use of community forest resources? If yes, what category 
of farmers?  Natives, non-natives, registered or non-registered farmers? 
2) What is the level of involvement of farmers in farm allocation process? 
3) Are farmers involved in the appointment of group leadership? 
4) Are farmers represented in meeting to empower forest manager? 
5) What is the level of collaboration and coordination with municipality, local 
government authorities and Non-governmental Organisations?  
6) How often do the customary tenure institutions interact with farmers? 
 
EQUITY 
1) Does the customary tenure give equal opportunities to natives and non-natives, or 
registered farmers and non-registered farmers of the council (BBNRMC) within the 
village communities? 
2) Is land equally distributed amongst farmers within their unions? 
3) Are contending parties in conflict given equal opportunities to provide evidence and 
prove their case? 
4) Are farmers given equal opportunities to express their views on decision- making on 
the use of community resources? 
 
 ACCOUNTABILITY. 
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1) Is there evidence of the presence of mechanisms for accountability? 
2) Are the mechanisms for questioning and explaining adopted by the farmers? 
3) Are financial records open for external audit? 
 
COMPETENCE 
1) Are the procedures for farm allocation, monitoring and conflict resolution clear and 
simple? 
2) Does the tenure practice protect land rights of farmer groups? 
3) Are there appeal mechanisms for conflict resolution? 
4) Are competent people used in farm allocation process? 
5) Are land conflicts solved on time? How responsive is the institutions to the needs of 
village communities?  
6) Are procedures for registration of farmers groups clear? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
